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Introduction
Managed care has taken a dominant role in dictating the financing and
delivery of care in the health care industry. While the dual goal of managed care
is to contain costs while increasing quality, there is increasing concern that the
cost-cutting measures of managed care are now having a negative impact on the
quality of care. There is growing belief that the managed care pendulum has
swung too far, and backlash has ensued.
In today’s managed care environment, physicians are held financially
accountable for their medical treatment decisions thereby placing them in potential
conflict with their fiduciary obligation toward their patient. Patients are not always told of
their treatment options due to clauses in physician’s contracts that do not permit them to
disclose non-covered or experimental treatments. The media and the press have
exploited these concerns by sensationalizing HMO "horror stories", lending to the
public’s negative opinion of managed care. Anecdotal stories became more frequent in
the media and popular press. As this occurred, the public began to loose confidence in
the health care system because it hadn’t lived up to its expectations. Public interest and
the concern for protection of their rights increased. Politicians capitalized on the public’s
concern by proposing patient protection legislation as a solution.
In the absence of a federally established framework, a multitude of managed
care laws has proliferated at the state level which vary in scope and application.
Experience at the local level provides a context that may have important implications for
consideration at the national level. Federal legislation would have both positive and
negative implications for each of the major players (patients, physicians, employers, and
managed care organizations) and to the future direction of the funding and delivery of
health care. For these reasons, the debate remains open over whether, and to what
extent, the Federal government should regulate managed care.
Chapter 1:
Roots of the Problem: The Evolution of Managed Care
To better understand the dominant role that managed care plays in the industry
today, it is necessary to trace its roots. The group health insurance industry has over a
one hundred-year history, dating to the early 1900’s. Group health insurance grew out
of accident and sickness benefits that were developed for the railroad, mining and
shipping industries in the mid- to late 1800’s. Montegomery Ward & Co. entered into
one of the earliest group insurance contracts in 1910. From this point, the group health
insurance industry was established as the National Convention of Insurance
Commissioners developed the first model for state law, and when the Blue Cross
Commission was founded in 19372.
The traditional comprehensive indemnity plan was the predominant model group
health plan into the 1970’s when health maintenance organizations (HMOs) were
formally introduced to the marketplace. Under indemnity health care coverage,
physicians were reimbursed retrospectively for each procedure or service rendered.
There was little or no insurance company oversight of physician treatment decisions.
Technology was ample and utilized frequently, justifying premium rate increases
demanded by insurance companies. Health care costs rose year after year,
EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits, fourth edition, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1993
Ibid.
Ibid. in 1973, the Health Maintenance Organization Act established requirements for entities seeking designation as
federally qualified HMO. The act also required most employers who offer an HMO to offer a federally qualified HMO.
representing an increasingly larger proportion of the gross domestic product (GNP).
Managed care was the industry’s answer to eliminate unnecessary and inappropriate
care that was abundant in an open-ended, unchecked health care system.
This chapter reviews factors that have lead to the evolution of managed care,
including those in the medical community (i.e., the proliferation of medical specialties
and the pervasiveness of technology) and in the corporate world (the corporate
organization, oversight, and finance of health care). Managed care came about when
these two spheres joined together, and flourished after a decade of inflation fueled by
high technology and reimbursement of care on a fee-for-service basis.
Fee-for-Service Payment
Up through the early 1980s, the fee-for-service model of physician payment
dominated the health care industry. As the name implies, this payment method
reimburses physicians on a retrospective basis for each service performed. The
production incentives inherent in this type payment rewards physicians for providing
more services: the more services a physician provides, the higher his/her earnings.
Within the fee-for-service environment, there are no financial constraints on
physicians to provide marginal or even unnecessary care. The propensity for over-
treatment introduces an increased risk of adverse physical or mental effects, creating an
imbalance between health and harm which, even when well-intentioned, conflicts with
the Hippocratic Oath. This phenomenon has been evidenced in studies showing over-
use of antibiotics to treat colds, other viral upper respiratory tract infections, and
bronchitis; conditions for which antibiotics are ineffective and may even cause harm or
threat to the patient through adverse reaction.
The notion of "more is better’ has been fostered by a society that has become
accustomed to an aggressive medical culture, and is well suited to the production
incentives of fee-for-service reimbursement. Our medical culture is curative in nature
and its diagnostic precision is driven by expensive technology. As a result, the average
patient has come to expect a lab test, X-ray, or at the very least a prescription drug as
part of their medical evaluation.
Growth in the Number of Specialists
The categorization of medical knowledge dates back to Darwin’s publication of
the Origin of Species. The impetus behind the growth in specialization can be traced
back to the Flexner Report, released in 1910. Abraham Flexner, together with the
American Medical Association’s Council on Education, proposed that radical
reconstruction of medical education would lead to improved medical care in the United
O’Brien, L. Bad Medicine: How the American Establishment Is Ruining our Healthcare System Prometheus Books, New
York; 1999, pp.12-13. The Greek physician Hippocrates (460 B.C.- 370 B.C.) published the first guideline intended to
govern physician behavior. Physicians profess the Hippocratic Oath in obtaining a license to practice medicine, which
says in part: The regimen adopt shall be for the benefit ofmy patients according to my ability andjudgement, and not
for their hurt or for any wrong.
5 Gonzales, R., et al. Antibiotic Prescribing for Adults with Colds, Upper Respiratory Tract Infections, and Bronchitis.
JAMA. 1997; 278:901-904.
Nyquist, AC et al. Antibiotic Prescribing for Children with Colds, Upper Respiratory Tract Infections, and Bronchitis.
JAMA. 1998; 279:875-877.
States. The Flexner Report was seen as a pivotal point in time during which American
medicine became a scientifically based discipline6. This report supported the expansion
of medical specialization in an effort to overcome the perception that medicine in the
United States was "inferior" to European medicine. The promulgation of these
recommendations, embraced by the medical guild, began the proliferation of medical
specialties in the top universities.
Until very recently, surgeons and specialists are recognized as the premiere
players within medical universities and hospitals. Specialists are portrayed to medical
students as the most lucrative and attractive profession for a physician. Specialists and
surgeons bring in the largest amount of revenue to the health care organizations and
hospitals and they frequently receive the largest federal grants and other research
monies. Family practitioners, who had been at the helm of American medicine, have
come to be perceived as "second or third class players, and a source of some
embarrassment to the profession’’7. Another significant contribution of the Flexner
Report on the medical community was his estimation of the proper ratio of physicians to
the general population. In the 1910 report, he stated that the ratio should be 67
physicians to each 100,000 people. A startling comparison is the current ratio: 240
physicians per 100,000 people8. This number far exceeds Flexner’s benchmark, and will
only increase as medical schools continue to turn out more physicians who will select to
6
Blumenthal, D., Scheck, A., Improving Clinical Practice: Total Quality Management and the Physician, San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1995, p. 13
7 O’Brien, L. Ibid, p. 96
8 O’Brien, L. Ibid, p. 100
complete their residency in one of numerous existing or evolving medical specialties or
sub-specialties.
The health care industry experienced the first boom in specialists immediately
following World War I1. Nearly two-thirds of doctors who had served in the War took
advantage of their veteran benefits for continuing education, and developed themselves
as specialists. Over the next twenty years, the number of specialists began to surpass
the number of primary care providers so that by 1966, nearly 70% of physicians called
themselves specialists9. This explosion of medical specialties had the effect of driving
generalist physicians out of the top ranks of medical professions.
As health care economics would predict, the abundance of specialists predicated
the demand for their services, and fueled the perceived need and demand for high cost,
specialized care. Within the traditional indemnity environment there were no controls to
limit access to specialists or pre-authorization of services, thus contributing to the
escalation of costs. Furthermore, within company-sponsored coverage, employers’
contribution to increasing premiums was often not disclosed to the employee. However,
employees were keenly aware of their premium contributions, which were indicated as
deductions from their paycheck. This phenomenon had the effect of cultivating a sense
of entitlement to health care. In this way, Americans molded their expectation of health
care: receive the highest quality of care, without question, and with little regard or
sensitivity to cost.
9
Rothstein, WG. American Medical Schools, New York: Oxford University Press; 1978:187-188
Advancements in Medical Technology
Advancements in technology have enabled our nation to excel in medical and
genetic science beyond any other nation in the world. Surgeons can perform minimally
invasive surgeries with fiber optics that were once considered major operations requiring
hospitalization. Our diagnostic capabilities have increased early detection of otherwise
deadly cancers, are instrumental in identifying genetic disorders, and are used to screen
and treat chronic diseases (e.g., cholesterol, diabetes, high blood pressure).
In the presence of such powerful technology, our view of death and dying has
become that of technical defeat rather a natural occurrence of life. The medical
community, taught to exhaust all technical means possible to preserve life, had made
end-of-life decisions difficult in the face of even the slimmest possibilities. In the book
The Social Transformation ofAmerican Medicine, Paul Starr refers to "therapeutic
relentlessness" as a contemporary definition of death"
In its commitment to the preservation of life, medical care
ironically has come to symbolize a prototypically modern form of torture,
combining benevolence, indifference, and technical wizardry. Rather
than engendering trust, technological medicine often raises anxieties
about the ability of individuals to make choices for themselves.
10 Starr, P., The Social Transformation ofAmerican Medicine, New York: Basic Books, 1982, p. 390.
The pharmaceutical industry has made significant contributions to the world of
medical technology. The endless number of drugs that have been developed over the
past twenty years enable people to live longer, sometimes healthier and more productive
lives. The large amount of research and development behind such advancements often
come attached with a hefty price tag. Studies issued in 1999 indicate that health care
costs are rising largely as a result of double-digit increases in the price of high-
technology "break-through" prescription drugs, increased prescribing by physicians, and
aggressive advertising by drug companies that stimulates patient demand,2. This
growth trend is projected to continue into the next five years.
Advertising, used by health plans, hospitals, and pharmaceutical companies has
raised the public’s awareness of specialized services, high-tech equipment, and new
prescription drugs. As a result, consumers, now more than ever before, have become
acutely aware of their treatment choices. They ask for, and expect, brand name drugs
or the highest technology procedure to be used by their physician. As more managed
care organizations use restrictive formularies, pharmaceutical manufacturers have
begun to use a controversial marketing techniques called direct-to-consumer advertising,
or "DTC", in an effort influence physicians and patients. Advertisements for allergies,
hair loss, depression, and high cholesterol, for example, are put before consumers and
doctors in magazines, television, radio, and the Internet. In 1998, DTC spending was
William M. Mercer Incorporated, 1 Annual National Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans, 1999
Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Large Employers Projecting Double Digit Increases In Prescription Drug Benefit Costs, July
13, 1999 Press Release
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estimated to have doubled from $1billion in 1997 to nearly $2 billion in 1998. This
information has empowered consumers with increased knowledge about drug therapies
or alternative treatments and has contributed to the increased utilization of expensive
brand name prescription drugs’.
Policy experts believe that abundance and excessive use of technologies are at
the root of health care’s escalating costs. One reason for this is that often times, the
expensive nature of technology does not yield a return by reaching economies of
scale6. In the early 80’s many states implemented "certificate of need" (CON)
provisions. In addition to regulating the acquisition of equipment, states required health
care facilities to obtain a certificate of approval for changes in the level of services of
number of hospital beds7. This required process was many states response to regulate
the number of hospitals and facilities purchasing expensive equipment such as CAT
scan or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machines.
Another reason that technology has raised the price of health care is that often
times technological innovations substantially increases utilization, particularly when the
new technology is quicker, easier, less invasive, or less traumatic to the patient than its
13 Ohliger, PC, JD. DTC Advertising and the Potential Liability of Manufacturers, Drug Benefit Trends 11 (8):39-40,
November, 1999.
14 Watson Wyatt Worldwide, ibid.
15 Ginzberg, Eli, "High -Tech Medicine and Rising Health Care Costs", Journal of the American Medical Association, April
1990; 263:1820-1822.
16 Herzlinger, Regina, ibid.
17 Hansen, E., Carneal, G., State Regulation, from The Managed Health Care Handbook, second edition, Aspen
Publications" Maryland, 1993, p. 404
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predecessor. Examples of this include gall bladder surgery and laparoscopic
cholecystectomy, where the rates of these procedures increased dramatically after the
introduction of a less invasive surgery8.
Despite the advancements that technology may bring to bear, it contributes to the
escalating price of health care, even when the cost of the procedure is lower using the
new technology. This is because the price of the procedure is based upon an amount
that an insurer is willing to pay, and to a lesser extent on the basis of the economic cost
of the resources that the procedure requires9. When the demand for health care
services is determined by patient demand, the price will nearly always rise.
Financial incentives will also influence the type of care that is rendered more so
than is reflected by the actual needs of the population. For example, in the United
States, we own approximately 11 MRIs per one million people compared to one per
million in England and Canada, or three machines per one million in West Germany2.
Similarly, American doctors perform more high-cost medical and surgical procedures. In
1991, U.S. surgeons performed 1,000 coronary bypass surgeries per one million people.
This rate is roughly three times higher than Canada, which contrasts to only 400
18 Legorreta, Antonio P., et al., Increased Cholecystectomy Rate After the Introduction of Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy,
JAMA, Vol. 270, no. 12 (Sept. 22-29, 1993), 1429-31
19 Herzlinger, Regina: ibid, p.21"3.
2o Herzlinger, Regina, Market Driven Health Care: Who Wins, Who Loses in the Transformation ofAmerica’s Largest
Service Industry. Massachusetts: Perseus Books; 1997, p. 217.
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surgeries in France and 500 per one million in West Germany2. Clearly, our health care
costs are high not only because we use it more frequently than other countries, but
because we also have more of it.
The rate of cardiac procedures in the United States may be viewed as excessive,
especially in relation to other countries such as Canada. A 1994 study published in the
Journal of the American Medical Association compared rates of inappropriate use of
cardiac procedures in New York State to those in Canada. The findings suggested that
the U.S. performed more procedures, but few were deemed inappropriate, leading the
reader to conclude that perhaps Canadians may have received too few cardiac
procedures22. The same study pointed out that those Canadians who did had a cardiac
procedure performed waited longer, on average, than the American cohort. Presumably,
this points to Canada’s shortage of technology, and also to the fewer number of
cardiologists available to treat these patients2. Viewed in this light, many may argue
that our abundance of technology has positive implications for Americans’ quality of life.
On the other hand, critics of our system claim that the supply of medical
technology creates its own demand, which renders the medical market irrational2’.
Studies have been conducted to understand whether the availability of medical
21
Ibid, pg. 217.
22 McGlynn, E., et al., Comparison of the Appropriateness of Coronary Angiography and Coronary Artery Bypass Graft
Surgery between Canada and New York State, JAMA 272 (12):934-40, Sept. 28, 1994
23 Health Insurance Association of America, Source Book of Health Insurance Data, 1994, p. 124.
2’ O’Brien, L., Ibid, p. 10
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resources creates unnecessary demand. In one particular analysis, treatments of ten
thousand New York heart attack patients were tracked. The findings revealed that
patients who were admitted to hospitals with facilities equipped to provide angioplasty or
bypass surgery where more likely to receive these services than those patients admitted
to hospitals without this technology2. While the study may support critics’ claim, the
author of the study was careful to point out that the hospitals with high availability of
technology did not infer that the services rendered were unnecessary. Without clinically
justifiable rates of service use, the study could not conclude that these patients received
unnecessary care.
Positive aspects of technology are reflected in our nation’s average life span,
which is longer, albeit marginally, in comparison to Germany and the United Kingdom,
but lower than Canada26. Technology has enhanced the quality of life for many
chronically ill Americans, and has sustained the life of millions of prematurely born
infants.
The pervasiveness of technology has also contributed to increased costs. Health
plans and hospitals often purchase the most up-to-date technology to attract the best
doctors and will market to the public their leading edge equipment and facilities. The
capital expense of equipment, when used infrequently outweighs a return that may be
achieved through larger economies of scale. In order to recoup costs, providers and
2s Blustein, High Technology Cardiac Procedures: The Impact of Service Availability on Service Use in New York State,
JAMA, Vol. 270, no. 3 (July 21, 1993), 344
Rublee, Dale A., International Health Systems: A Chartbook Perspective, 2r edition, Chicago: Center for Health
Policy Research, AMA, 1993, p. 7
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hospitals have raised their prices accordingly.
Government-Sponsored Health Insurance
In the mid-1960s, Medicare and Medicaid were developed to provide federal
money to fund the cost of health insurance for the elderly and the poor. These programs
were not equal in design or contribution. Reimbursement to providers for Medicaid was
paid at a lower rate than Medicare or commercial insurance. As a result, fewer providers
accepted Medicaid patients, forcing them to use clinics or expensive emergency room
care.
In the ensuing years, the Medicare population grew in size and age and also
gained political clout. The elderly leveraged their status to raise the standard of their
health care coverage to be more in line with that of private insurance, thus widening the
disparity from Medicaid coverage. With the predominant reimbursement being fee-for-
service, the Medicare and Medicaid programs also contributed to the inflation of the 70s
and 80s.
After ten years of unchallenged health care inflation, the Health Care Finance
Administration (HCFA) devised a prospective payment scheme based upon length of
stay limits and payments specific to diagnosis, called diagnosis related group (DRGs).
This pre-payment mechanism was implemented to contain rising hospital costs of the
Medicare population. If hospitals effectively managed their admissions to HCFA’s pre-
determined length of stay, they would break-even financially. If, on the other hand, the
hospital discharged the patient prior to the prescribed length of stay, the hospital was
15
rewarded by claiming the difference of the cost versus the Medicare payment as
savings. Under the DRG prospective payment scheme, hospitals were financially
incented to quickly treat and discharge patients2. The upshot of DRGs was that the
average length of stay decreased by 24% and mortality remained unchanged before and
after its inception28. The down side of DRGs was the shifting of costs to privately
insured patients that followed. This began a cycle of cost shifting whereby the privately
insured population was brought to bear the cost of those with little or no health
insurance29.
Corporate Management of Health Care
The government has supported the corporate management of medicine through
the passage of Title XlII of the Public Health Service Act, better known as the HMO Act
of 1973. This federal act played a key role in the expansion of managed care because
it established organizational and operating requirements for HMOs. More importantly,
the government funded the HMO Act through grant monies and loans that were
earmarked to finance the development of HMOs. This served to boost the number of
27 Schramm, Carl J. Health Care And Its Costs: Can the U.S. Afford Adequate Health Care?, The American Assembly,
New York: 1987, p. 87.
28 Fienglass, J., Holloway, J., "The Initial Impact of the Medicare Prospective Payment System on U.S. Health Care: A
Review of Literature", Medical CareReview, Spring 1991;48:1.
29 Health Insurance Association of America, Group Life & Health Insurance, 1988 edition, p. 151.
3o Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973: Public Law 93-222, 93r Congress, S. 14, December 29, 1973
31 Handley, Elisabeth, The Hows and Whys of Federal Qualification and Eligibility, Chapter 35 of The Mnaged Care
Handbook, Second Edition, Aspen Publication: Chicago, 1993, p. 410.
16
HMOs and their enrollment. At the same time, HMOs were endorsed by the business
community and also had bipartisan support. HMOs were appealing to these groups on
the basis that they proclaimed to contain costs through free-market competition with little
government intervention. As a result, managed care proliferated at the state level.
The introduction of Medicare and Medicaid in the mid-60s advanced the
corporate practice of medicine. These federally funded programs stimulated the growth
of investor-owned hospitals chains and medical university centers, creating a demand
for management staff32. Third party payers were regulated by the government in the
delivery of health care services to the elderly and the poor, thus imposing more controls
on physicians, hospitals, and patients alike.
The prospective payment system implemented by the government was initially
targeted at hospitals, which represented a large portion of the elderly population’s health
expenditures. The government was also keenly aware of the physician’s role in ordering
ancillary services and also determining a patient’s length of stay. For example, in 1985,
approximately 19% of total health care expenditures were for physician services.
However, another 50-60% of total health care expenditures was under physicians’
wield3. In 1985, a payment freeze was placed upon Part B of the Medicare program4,
which subsidizes payments for physician services. During this time hospital
administrators were under increasing pressure to contend with doctors to contain costs.
32
MacLeod, Gordon, An Overview of Managed Health Care, Essentials of Managed Health Care, Aspen Publishers:
1995.
33 Schramm, C., ibid, p. 88.
3’ Schramm, C., ibid, p. 89.
17
Physicians and hospitals, albeit unwillingly, were forced to work together as they
became jointly responsible for managing the cost of care.
Physicians banded together, leaving the traditional solo practice behind. By the
mid-1990s, nearly one-third of all physicians practiced medicine in a group setting of
three or more physicians. Physicians became increasingly exposed to corporate
influences as they began to contract for their services with managed care organizations,
particularly investor owned companies. In a for-profit organization, the mission is to
enhance shareholder wealth, and there is a legal obligation toward its investors.
Physicians that contracted with investor-owned managed care organizations
were subject to the administration’s profit motives, financial incentives, cost containment
programs, quality assurance initiatives, and method(s) of reimbursement. Physicians
became exposed to other corporate influences such as mergers, acquisitions, buyouts,
and having their services marketed to the public. Physicians were slowly loosing their
autonomy to freely practice medicine. The forces dictating the market, employers and
insurance companies, were heavily invested in ensuring that health care costs were
lowered. In order to fulfil this mission, insurance companies began to micro-manage
physicians by influencing their treatment decisions right from the start.
In the corporate organization of health care, responsibility for the delivery of
health care shifted from the individual physician to a corporate entity and raised ethical
issues in the minds of physicians and patients. There is a potential conflict between
physicians’ oath to do no harm and their professional obligation to the managed care
Schramm, C., ibid, p. 89.
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organization. The corporate organization of health care delivery plays an important role
in the structure of managed care, and has also contributed to its backlash. This is
discussed further in Chapter 3.
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
Just after World War II broke out, the labor market shrunk, and employers were
subject to strict wage controls. Employers began to offer health care coverage as fringe
benefit to attract and retain employees. Labor union leaders negotiated for health care
coverage and companies generally obliged. The number of people with employer-
sponsored insurance increased from just 12 million in 1940 (less than one-tenth of the
population), to 77 million in 1950, and up to 123 million in 1960 (representing nearly 60%
of the population)6.
Health care benefits are considered part of an employee’s total compensation
package, and as such, can be a considered as a substitute for take-home pay.
Employers pay a large portion of the group health insurance premium, with the
remainder usually deducted directly from the employee’s paycheck. Often times
employees are only aware of their contribution toward the coverage, which currently
tends to be less than 25 percent7. Employer-sponsored health care fostered two
36
Health Insurance Association of America, Source Book of Health Insurance Data, Washington: Health Insurance
Association of America, 1994,
37
Reinhardt, Uwe E., The Predictable Managed Care Kvetch on the Rocky Road from Adolescence to Adulthood, Journal
of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 24, No. 5, October 1999.
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unfavorable attitudes toward health benefits. First, employees felt entitled to health care
because of their contribution toward the premium, and secondly, they were only aware of
their fraction of the total cost, providing little sensitivity to the full cost of the health care
coverage. For all intents and purposes, employer-sponsored health insurance became
considered as an entitlement; an unending free resource.
As one of the largest sources of health care coverage, employers have had a
profound impact on shaping the funding and delivery of health care as it stands today.
With the enactment of ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act) in 19748, the
federal government exempted "self-insured" employers from state insurance regulations.
When an employer is self-insured, the employer pays the health care claims directly
rather than purchasing a risk contract through an insurance company.
Being self-insured is especially appealing to large companies with multiple work
locations crossing over state lines, which makes it difficult and expensive to administer
health benefits. Employers have found that by funding their own insurance, cash flow is
increased and positively impacts the bottom line. Being self-insured also affords an
employer with the flexibility to craft benefit plans suited to their workforce’s needs, rather
than purchasing coverage from an insurance company and being restricted to state
mandated benefits. Finally, under ERISA, self-insured plans are not subject to state-
imposed taxes. Although the administrative costs associated with self-insured plans are
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 USC 1003 (b)
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typically higher than that of a traditional insurance coverage, the flexibility and
burdensome state taxes are strong incentives for employers to self-insure.
Although ERISA has been intact for 25 years, the implications on the health care
industry have been profound and lasting. Since ERISA permits freedom of plan design
and coverage, bottom-line focused employers have engaged a variety of strategies to
control health care costs. Some employers altered their contribution toward their
employees’ monthly premium, or strategically priced their health plans to encourage
selection of managed care plans over more costly indemnity plans. Other employers
raised coinsurance and deductibles, or placed limits on certain benefits. Employers
have made such drastic reductions to certain benefits that legislation was required to
intervene. For example, many states, including Connecticut, have mandated minimum
lengths of stay for maternity admissions. In 1997, federal legislation was enacted to
require employers to equalize benefit provisions placed upon mental illness so that they
are treated similarly to benefit restrictions placed on physical illness. The Mental Health
Parity Act mandated employers to remove dollar limits on mental health care that are not
in place for other medical conditions9.
Employer’s strategies alone were not entirely effective in controlling costs.
Throughout the 60’s and 70’s, employers were very generous with their benefits, with
some companies paying 100 percent of the cost of insurance. As national health
spending rose by double digits in the 80’s, companies’ generosity waned, and they
began to ask their workers to share in the increasing cost of health care. Employees did
Mental Health Parity Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-5
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not take kindly to this change. During the recession of the late 80’s, many of the labor
strikes included health care benefits as a key bargaining issue.
Employers pressed on insurance companies to take a more vested role in
managing the soaring costs and utilization. In response, insurance companies tried to
reduce the price of health care by negotiating volume discounts with groups of providers.
In return, doctors would benefit from the business generated by the insurance
companies’ covered population. This arrangement was called a preferred provider
arrangement, or PPO.
Also at this time, published results from health services research provided
statistical analysis that demonstrated considerable variation in physician practice
patterns and inappropriate use of certain procedures. A study completed by John
Wennberg showed tremendous regional variation in how doctors perform the same
procedure,. Robert Brook of the Rand Corporation, together with Mark Chassin, et al.
completed an analysis that determined geographical differences could not explain the
variation of inappropriate use of high frequency procedures such as coronary
angiography, carotid endarterectomy, and upper gastrointestional tract endoscopy’=2.
The notion that American doctors were operating too often was now empirically founded,
providing the justification for managed care.
4o Wennburg, J. Small Area Variation in Health Care Delivery, Science 182, Dec. 14, 1973
41 Wennberg, J., Gittelsohn, A. Variations in Medical Care Among Small Areas, Scientific American, April 1982
42 Chassin, M., Brook, R., Does Inappropriate Use Explain Geographical Variations in the Use of Health Care Services?
November 13, 1987, JAMA 258(18): 2533-37
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Insurance companies began to employ micro-management strategies. These
programs were targeted at physicians and focused on reducing inappropriate and
unnecessary care. Pre-admission certification, pre-admission testing, second surgical
opinion, and utilization review commonly overlaid the traditional indemnity plan. It was
during this time when insurance companies ventured into the management of health
care by directing oversight activities on physicians and hospitals. However, as costs
continued to rise, employers and insurers came to the belief that the only effective way
to control costs was to intervene before doctors ever saw a patient. This concept
became what is known as managed care.
Chapter 2:
What is Managed Care?
Managed care consists of various types of organizations characterized by
different methods of delivering and contracting health care coverage. The basic tenet to
maintain costs, increase access and quality, and provide affordable care, however, is
common across all the organizations. As managed care has evolved and matured, the
delineation of these organizations has become somewhat blurred. Therefore, the
descriptions that follow reflect the five health care delivery systems that were in place in
the initial stages of managed care. Also reviewed in this chapter are features that
commonly define managed care, including: physician reimbursement methods and
incentives that reward cost-effectiveness, utilization management programs to contain
costs, quality processes and outcomes, accountability for performance, and affordability
of coverage.
Organizational Features of Managed Care Plans
Managed care includes a range of delivery system alternatives to the traditional
indemnity health insurance. The range of organizations can best be conceptualized by
plotting cost control, accountability and quality along a continuum (see Figure 1). As the
delivery system definition moves from left to right elements of control and accountability
increase as does the potential for control of cost and quality. Managed indemnity is on
the low end of the continuum (loosely managed costs, no accountability) and closed
panel HMOs at the high end (tightly managed costs and full accountability).
23

25
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO)
PPOs are entities through which employers or insurance companies contract for
health care services from a select group of doctors, hospitals, or facilities. PPOs are
characterized by the claim that providers are selected, or preferred, to be included in a
network. Preferred providers are usually selected on the basis of cost efficiency and
reputation, and may encompass physicians, hospitals and/or diagnostic facilities. As a
provision of their contract, participating providers agree to concede to the PPO’s
utilization management programs. These programs are aimed at controlling the cost
and utilization of health care services provided to covered individuals, and are discussed
in more detail later in this chapter.
Providers in a PPO do not assume any financial risk. By participating in the
PPO, they agree to accept the negotiated payment rate, and are reimbursed on a fee-
for-service basis. Fees for the services are generally discounted from charges, but can
also take the form of a per diem or DRG rate. In return, the PPO receives business from
the individuals covered under the PPO plan. Employers will often structure their benefit
plan to encourage use of preferred providers so that they, and the covered individuals,
can benefit from the discounted charges. Although covered individuals are permitted to
see nonparticipating providers, they generally will pay a higher coinsurance as a result of
the higher charges.
’ Ibid, p. 26.
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Point of Service Plan (POS)
The POS plan, also referred to as an "open access HMO", permits covered
individuals to choose a non-participating provider at the time that the medical care is
needed. In a POS plan, the participating providers are part of a "network". Networks are
formed on the basis of the providers’ proximity to the residence of the covered
individuals, which encourages ease of access. As such, higher deductibles and a larger
coinsurance are typically applied to dissuade members from using non-participating
providers. Members are free to seek care from out-of-area providers or services, but
may be subject to utilization review or pre-certification of services.
A key feature characteristic of a POS plan is the primary care physician, or PCP.
The PCP acts as a gatekeeper for referrals to diagnostic testing, specialty or institutional
medical care, and authorizes emergency care. PCPs are generally reimbursed through
a capitation payment, which is a fixed payment per member per month. Under this type
of arrangement, the PCP assumes complete financial risk associated with managing the
cost of care for a defined population. There is often an amount that is withheld from
physicians’ compensation that is returned at the end of the year contingent upon
meeting the plan’s utilization or cost goals. The capitation of payments for primary care
services has innate cost controls, forcing the PCP to balance utilization and quality
assurance. Capitation clearly differentiates the POS plan cost control and accountability
from the more loosely managed indemnity and PPO plans.
There are a variety and mix of HMOs, but it is possible to classify an HMO on the
basis of its relationship between the physician and the HMO’s administration. For all
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intents and purposes, an HMO is considered to be a broker, serving as the intermediary
between the employer or insurance company, and the providers of care. There are
three different types of HMOs: Independent Practice Association (IPA), group, and staff
model HMOs.
Independent Practice Association (Open Panel HMO)
The IPA model HMO contracts with an association of physicians (the IPA), which
consists of individual or groups of doctors with their own private practice. The IPA model
is considered an "open panel" HMO because any physician that meets the IPA’s or
HMO’s credentials is eligible to participate in the HMO.
The IPA, which is a separate legal entity, may contract with one or more HMOs.
Physicians in the IPA agree to provide health care services for an enrolled population.
Participating physicians maintain their own offices and see private pay patients while
also treating HMO patients.
Most HMOs compensate an IPA using an all inclusive capitation payment4. The
PA then compensates its providers either on a fee-for-service basis, or a combination of
fee-for-service and primary care capitation (see Figure 2). When physicians accept a
capitated payment, they become accountable for managing the cost of treating their
covered population.
Wagner, E. Types of Managed Care Organizations, The Managed Health Care Handbook, second edition, Maryland:
Aspen Publication, 1993
4s Ibid, Figure 2 adapted from E. Wagner’s description of HMOs in Types ofManaged Care Organizations
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Group and Staff Model HMOs (Closed Panel HMOs)
In a group model, the HMO’s administration contracts with selected physician
groups to provide all physician services to the HMO’s members. In addition to their
HMO patients, physicians in the group model may see other non-HMO patients,
although their primary role may be to treat the HMO patients. The group practice may
contract on the basis of a captiation or fee-for-service. The group model is considered to
be a "closed panel" HMO because the physicians must be members of the group
practice in order to participate in the HMO.
29
Group Model HMO Staff Model HMO
Administration
OwSns/ Exclusiveontract
IHospitalsl IPhysician GrouPl IHospitals
IAdministrationi
OwnsS/ ploys
IPhysiciansl
Figure 3
Under the staff model HMO, the administration employs salaried physicians as
part of the HMO staff, and the physician treats only enrolled members of the parent
HMO. Physicians receive a salary and may also receive incentive payments on the
basis of productivity or performance. The staff model HMO is considered to be "closed
panel" because participating providers must be employed by the HMO and community
physicians are not able to participate.
Physician Reimbursement Mechanisms
The type of physician reimbursement, by virtue of their design, can influence the
way in which health care is delivered. There are four basic payment vehicles that exist
in managed care: fee-for-service, salary, discounted fee-for-service, and capitation.
With the exception of the salaried physician, any given provider group or physician may
receive payment in one or more of these forms.
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Fee-for-Service
As discussed earlier, fee-for-service entails reimbursing physicians,
retrospectively, for each service that is rendered. There are two significant problems
with fee-for-service in the context of managed care. The first is called "churning", which
means that doctors perform more services or schedule more return visits than are
necessary. From an outside perspective it seems legitimate to ask a patient to return
in two weeks to have their blood pressure checked instead of one month. From the
patient’s perspective, they are following the physician’s advice and few would argue
against professional recommendation. From the physician’s standpoint, money is
collected for the return office visit. This is not to say that physicians do this consciously
or in an unethical way, but the potential for churning perpetuates itself when health
plans’ fees are reduced. For example, a physician may feel compelled to see more
patients in a given month in fear that the fees will be cut back even more in the next
month. In managed care, utilization and peer review are two methods to ensure that
physicians do not abuse what could become a potentially self-fulfilling prophecy in an
unmanaged fee-for-service setting.
The second problem with fee-for-service in managed care is the potential for
"upcoding" (using CPT-4 codes that reimburse at a higher rate) and "unbundling"
(charging for services that previously were included in a single fee without lowering the
fee)49. An increased trend of inappropriate physician billing practices has been
Ibid.
48 Kongstvedt, Peter R., Compensation of Primary Care Physicians in Open Panels, Essentials of Managed Care, Aspen
Publications; Copyright 1995: pp. 88-89
4 Kongstvedt, Peter R., Ibid
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experienced nationwide. Some believe that upcoding and ubundling may be some
physicians’ response to recoup reduced or discounted fees. This creates a vicious circle
that ultimately results in inflated costs, and in turn unjustly punishes physicians who bill
fairly.
Plans that use fee-for-service reimbursement try to control the inherent
production incentive by incorporating various micro-management activities that are
aimed at reducing unnecessary or inappropriate care (e.g., utilization review, pre-
certification, or pre-authorization). These micro-management strategies are discussed in
more detail toward the end of this chapter. Unfortunately, however, many of the
utilization oversight activities counteract their cost effectiveness through increased
administrative costs.
Pre-negotiated Discount Arrangements
This type of arrangement typically coexists within an indemnity environment, as
is the case with preferred provider organizations (PPOs), or point of service plans
(POS). The employer or health plan that contracts with a hospital or group of physicians
within a PPO receives a discounted fee for a given group of procedure or types of
service (i.e., lab, x-ray, or chiropractic services). Since payment is made retrospectively,
the same production incentives exist as with the fee-for-service model.
so Pascuzzi, Elizabeth, Claims and Benefits Administration (p. 229); Ward, David, Operational Finance and Budgeting (p.
292) from Essentials of Mana.qed Care, Aspen Publications; Copyright 1995
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Salary
An HMO may pay their physician staff an annual salary. These physicians are
considered to be employees of the managed care organization. Although there are no
overt incentives to see more patients or to provide more services, as within the fee-for-
service environment, there is a perverse incentive inherent in a fixed salary to limit the
number of services provided to a patient. In fact, there is little financial incentive to
provide more than the minimum of care, and little incentive to provide preventive care.
Preventive care requires consultation, subsequent visits, follow-up test results, and
maintenance of accurate records. Compliance with this type of regimen is not tied to a
physician’s income, nonetheless, there have been many large staff model HMOs such
as Kaiser Permanente and Tufts, for example, that have employed full-time physicians.
These highly regarded HMOs were successful in providing a high level of preventive
service to their enrolled members.
Capitation
Capitation is a fixed monthly fee paid to a managed care organization for each
enrolled member2. Over the course of a year, the capitation amount is used to fund all
aspects of the enrolled population’s health care needs, regardless of whether the
members use services and regardless of how expensive those services are. The most
sl Hilman, AL, Health Maintenance Organizations, Financial Incentives, and Physicians’ Judgements, Annals of Internal
Medicine, 1990; 112:891-93.
s2 Health Insurance Association of America, Managed Care: Integrating the Delivery and Financing of Health Care (Part
A), second edition, Washington, D.C., 1996, p.228.
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commonly capitated services are those rendered by a primary care physician (PCP).
Slightly more than half of all HMOs reimburse over 60% of primary care services through
capitation arrangements. The capitation amount covers services that a PCP is
expected to deliver, including preventive care, outpatient care, and hospital admissions.
Diagnostic testing and certain surgical procedures may also be included in the scope of
primary care services, however these services may be carved-out and separately
capitated. Finally, payment for referral services to specialists and institutional services
(e.g., radiology, pathology, and anesthesia) may come out of a capitation fund that is
separate from the PCP’s fixed fee. As a PCP’s patients incur these services, an amount
is drawn from the appropriate capitated pool. The PCP does not receive this money; the
managed care organization will keep track of expenses incurred by a PCP’s members
and will reconcile this against the various pools at the end of the year.
An important phenomenon occurs when a physician receives capitation. Since
the payment is fixed, the risk of the population is shifted from the health plan to the
physician. In accepting this financial risk, the HMO or physician group hopes that the
premiums it collects will outweigh the costs of the health care utilized by the enrolled
population, resulting in profit. Physicians are under scrutiny via financial incentives,
withholds, and the like, to not exceed expenses allocated for their population. In
essence, the provider or physician has taken on the role of an insurance company.
Moreover, by blending the finance and delivery of health care, the physician has an
allegiance to their managed care organization, a personal motive to succeed, and a
3 Interstudy, HMO Industry Report 9.1, July 1998.
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professional obligation to make treatment decisions without the undue influence of
financial incentives.
Physician Incentives
In managed care plans the PCP is the point of entry into the healthcare system.
By and large the economic viability and success of the health plan is largely dependent
on the physician’s ability to practice cost effective, efficient medicine. Since the
physician has a critical role as the gatekeeper, managed care organizations will target
financial incentives to encourage and reward the preferential practice of cost effective
care.
Incentives may take the form of rewards or penalties, or may be a combination of
both. Withholding is a popular form of incentive in which a percentage of a physician’s
fee is withheld. If the HMO has a deficit year, the amount is withheld and returned at the
end of a profitable year. Withhold amounts can range from one percent to as much as
over 30 percent, although most typical is in the area of 11 to 20 percent. Certainly the
size of the withhold amount exerts some amount of influence on a physician’s decision
to provide services (or not). This illustrates a controversial issue of managed care that
raises the question of ’at what point does a financial incentive create a conflict between
the patient’s best interest and the physician’s pecuniary interest?’.
Hillman, AL. Financial Incentives for Physicians in HMOs, Is There a Conflict?, NEJM, 1987; 317:1743-48, p. 1745.
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Beyond withhold percentages, physicians can be placed at further risk through
other mechanisms. Examples include increasing the withhold amount for the coming
year, placing liens on future earnings, decreasing the amount of the capitation for the
following year, being excluded from the program, and/or reduction in the distribution from
fund surpluses. Risk pools are yet another form of incentive. Risk pools are applied to
primary care physicians and their use of budgeted monies for referrals to specialists
and/or hospital services.
There is considerable information about HMOs’ use of financial incentives and
their association to financial performance and use of resources6’’8, however the direct
effect on physician decision making has not been clearly established, only postulated.
Managed Care Cost Controls
There are a number of utilization management programs used by managed care
organizations and can be categorized into two broad categories: macro-management
and micro-management techniques. Micro-management programs are directed at the
individual case or physician level whereas macro-management techniques draw upon
data and are applied broadly to influence physician behavior. Both forms of cost
ss Hillman, AL, ibid.
r Hillman, AL, et al, "Contractual Arrangements Between HMOs and Primary Care Physicians: Three-Tiered HMOs and
Risk Pools", (Medical Care 1992; 30:136-148).
sz Hillman, AL, et al. "How Do Financial Incentives Affect Physician’s Clinical Decisions and the Performance of Health
Maintenance Organizations?", (NEJM, 1989; 321:86-92).
Hillman, AL, "Financial Incentives for Physicians in HMOs", Ibid.
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controls can be coupled with financial incentives to encourage cost effective practice of
medicine and physician compliance.
Micro-management tools
Managed care companies use pre-certification to minimize unnecessary or
inappropriate hospital admissions. Cases are reviewed against criteria and are assigned
a length of stay. Failure to obtain pre-certification often results in a financial penalty to
the physician or the patient. Pre-authorization for elective procedures is often required
as well.
Utilization review encompasses a spectrum of case management techniques.
After a patient is admitted to the hospital, the managed care company will concurrently
review the case to monitor the patient’s stay to ensure that it does not exceed the
predetermined length of stay. For catastrophic cases, utilization review case managers
will work with the patient and the physician to review alternative care settings. This is to
assure that the patient’s medical needs are met while also making use of the most cost-
effective care. Discharge planning is yet another form of utilization management where
case managers will assist the family with post-discharge services such home health care
or home infusion therapy.
In cases where the managed care plans also pay claims, retrospective claims
review may be conducted to identify suspicious physician billing practices such as up-
coding or unbundling (coding fragmentation). Retrospective chart reviews are also
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conducted to profile cases with poor outcomes such as nosocomial (hospital acquired)
infections or those that resulted in death.
Clinical guidelines are another form of micro-management. Practice guidelines
provide optimal strategies for diagnosis and management of disease. Guidelines may
be industry standards, or may be based upon the consensus of a panel of experts9.
Managed care companies implement clinical guidelines with the desire to improve care,
reduce variation of physician practices, eliminate inappropriate procedures, and reduce
costs6. The premise is that by following a critical path with demonstrated optimal
outcomes, cost will decline, and the quality of outcomes will increase. Physicians’
adherence to clinical guidelines is somewhat dictated by how the managed care
organization enforces and endorses their use.
By design, capitation has inherent cost containment incentives. For example, by
accepting a fixed feed for an undetermined number of comprehensive health care
services, a physician is accountable for managing these costs within a budgeted
amount. The incentive, therefore, is to manage the type and utilization of services vis-a-
vis cost efficient and effective treatments, administration of preventive services, and
avoidance of expensive specialty care. Proponents of HMOs claim that capitation and
other ancillary incentives are vital to the HMOs success at containing costs. Numerous
studies have pointed to managed care’s lower rates of utilization of services in
McNeil, BJ., et al. Current Issues in Profiling Quality of Care, Inquiry 29: 298-307, Fall 1992
Leavenworth, Geoffrey, Quality Costs Less, Business & Health, Special Report on Guidelines, 1995
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comparison to traditional coverage6’62’ 6. A 1994 Miller and Luft analysis reviewed the
performance of managed care plans since 1980. The literature review found lower
hospitalization rates, shorter average lengths of stay, and reduced intensity of tests and
procedures of HMOs compared to traditional indemnity plans6. A frequently cited
analysis conducted by Manning, et al, is a controlled trial that demonstrated lower
utilization rates for those persons who received care from an HMO (Group Health
Cooperative of Puget Sound in Seattle) versus those who received care from a fee-for-
service physician6. Utilization rates in prepaid group practices were markedly less
"hospital intensive and, consequently, less expensive", according to the 1984 results
published in The New England Journal of Medicine.
Macro-management tools
To foster accountability, some health plans publish report cards. Using claims
data, medical records, or surveys, health plans report on performance measures in the
areas of cost, quality, member satisfaction, and/or administrative efficiency. Public
disclosure of report cards is used as a method of improving accountability of physicians
61 Christensen, S. "The Effects ofManaged Care and Managed Competition", Washington, D.C., Congressional Budget
Office, February 1995
62 Smioth, DG. "The Effect of PPOs on Health Care Use and Costs". Final Report to the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation, Grant No. 20040. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, November 1995.
63 Luft, Harold, How Do HMOs Achieve Their "Savings"?, NEJM 298 24:1336-1342
Miller RH, Luft HS, Managed Care Plan Performance Since 1980: A Literature Analysis, JAMA, May 18, 1994; 271:
1512-19.
6s Manning, et al. A Controlled Trial of the Effect of a Prepaid Group Practice on Use of Services, NEJM 1984; 310:1505-
10.
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or institutions, but has benefits to other stakeholders in the health care system. For
example, purchasers (consumers and employers alike) can use information in the report
cards to make informed decisions when selecting a health plan. Some employers
require plan performance data as a means of holding health plans accountable for the
value of the coverage that they purchased. HEDIS, which is discussed in the next
section of this chapter, is an example of such plan performance data. Many large
commercial health plans voluntarily report performance data and publish select
measures (i.e., immunization rates and patient satisfaction) to increase their reputation
and position in the marketplace.
Another macro-management tool used by managed care companies to influence
physician behavior is provider profiling. Standardized information regarding physician-
specific outcomes are reported to the health plan’s physicians. The intent of furnishing
this information is threefold. First, the profiles increase awareness of individual and peer
practice patterns. Secondly, reporting of nationally accepted industry standard outcome
measures foster awareness of, and adherence to, evidence-based medicine. Thirdly,
profiles are used to provide confidential feedback to motivate professional self-
improvement66. Since this type of reporting is relatively new to managed care, its
effectiveness in reducing costs or improving outcomes has not been sufficiently
evidenced6.
Leatherman, S., McCarthy, D., Public Disclosure of Health Care Performance Reports: Experience, Evidence, and
Issues for Policy, International Journal for Quality in Health Care 1999; Vol. II, No. 2, 93-98.
67 UnitedHealth Group, Will Public Disclosure of Performance Information Help Improve the Health Care System?, Health
Care Policy Perspective, May 1999
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Focus on Quality
Managed care plans have several means of ensuring that their members have
access to, and receive high-quality care. These include: coordination of care by the
primary care physician, clinical quality improvement, and research programs.
The role of primary care physicians includes maintaining an ongoing relationship
with their patients, helping to arrange for services such as specialty visits, hospital care,
and home health care as needed68. Another role of the primary care physician is to
assure that patients receive medically-appropriate services in a timely manner.
Coordination of services through the primary care physician promotes continuity of care,
which is essential to quality.
Many managed care plans operate quality improvement and research programs
to monitor trends in health care, determine which treatments produce the best health
outcomes (known as clinical guidelines), establish quality improvement goals, and define
the process for making any needed improvements. Larger commercial health plans
have invested research and development costs to collect health care data. Among other
things, health plans use this data to analyze their patient populations and to track the
effects of programs aimed at improving the health status of high risk populations, or
clinical outcomes for chronic conditions (i.e., asthma, diabetes, coronary heart disease).
Reporting may also be done at the micro level to improve the health status of individual
68
Franks, P., Clancy, C. Gatekeeping Revisited-Protecting Patients From Overtreatment, NEJM 1992;6:424-427
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members. For example, data revealing abnormal test results may indicate the need for
follow-up, or a high-risk member may be targeted for intervention and education.
Since many health plans have extensive internal procedures in place to promote
quality, it is not surprising that multitudes of independent studies have been published on
the quality of care of managed care plans in comparison to traditional health care plans.
In 1994, Miller and Luft reviewed studies on the quality of care that were published since
1980. This study reported that the quality of care received by HMO members was
"roughly comparable" to traditional coverage (14 of 17 findings reflected similar or better
process and outcomes of care in HMOs)69. However, three years later the same
researchers performed another literature review on quality of care studies published
between 1993 to 1997, and found an equal number of significantly better and worse
results for HMOs compared to traditional coverage7.
Accountability
There are many points of accountability in managed care. Health plans are
accountable to meet required statutory and regulatory standards. Health plans are also
accountable to their members and their customers (i.e., employers) to measure and
report performance in the areas of access, satisfaction, solvency, network adequacy,
and quality of care. Furthermore, in a capitation arrangement, the physician is fully
accountable to the health plan to effectively manage the health care costs of their patient
69
Miller RH, Luft HS, Managed Care Plan Performance Since 1980, ibid
7o Miller RH, Luft HS, Does Managed Care Lead to Better or Worse Quality of Care? Health Affairs, September/October
1997; 16(5): 7-25.
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population within an allocated amount per year per patient. Finally, in employer-
sponsored health plans, employers are accountable for decisions regarding benefit
coverage, whereas physicians are accountable for quality of care that they administer.
Licensed health plans are held accountable for the quality of care they provide.
This is accomplished not only through member satisfaction surveys and internal quality
improvement programs, but also by complying with the extensive statutory and
regulatory requirements associated with state HMO laws, the Federal HMO Act,
Medicare and Medicaid standards, and requirements of the Federal Employees Health
Benefits Program (FEHBP).
In addition to meeting these requirements, health plans have responded to
consumer and employers’ demands for objective, standardized information about health
plan performance. The most well known and widely used system for reporting health
plan performance data is the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS).
HEDIS is a performance measurement system developed with collective input from
employers (including Xerox, GTE, Digital), consumer and labor representatives, health
plans, and quality experts. Borrowing on the concept of total quality management
(TQM), this group developed a set of quality (process and some outcomes) and member
satisfaction measures. These performance measures have been adopted by the
William L. Roper, M.D., M.P.H., Senior Vice President, Statement on Health Care Quality and Consumer Protection,
Prudential HealthCare for the American Association of Health Plans Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, Washington, D.C., March 6, 1997
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National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), a non-profit managed care
accreditation body, as part of their rigorous accreditation process, and have been used
by more than 350 health plans throughout the countryz. HEDIS includes detailed
information on health plan performance in the areas of quality, access to care, patient
satisfaction, membership stability, use of resources, financial soundness, and internal
management systems7.
Looking at accountability from a different perspective, individual or groups of
physicians are held accountable when they belong to a managed care plan that is paid a
capitation amount. In this type of financial arrangement, a physician or provider group
accepts a prepaid captitated fee on a monthly basis, and in doing so has also taken on a
dual responsibility. First, the physicians are accountable to their patients to provide
appropriate, efficacious, and timely care. Second, physicians are also accountable to
the health plan for managing these fees within the allotted amount for their base of
patients.
Affordability
Numerous studies have demonstrated managed care’s effectiveness at reducing
costs and hospitalization. A widely recognized study is the Health Insurance Experiment
conducted by the RAND Corporation4. This study demonstrated that physicians in
72 National Association for Quality Assurance (NCQA) 1999, http:llwww.ncqa.orglpageslmainloverview3.htm
73 NCQA, ibid.
74 Brook, RH et al., Use of Medical Cam in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Medical Care 1986; 24:SupplS1-S87
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prepaid plans hospitalized their patients as much as 40 percent less than their fee-for-
service counterparts, which resulted in HMOs overall lower expenses. The Health Care
Finance Administration (HCFA) has reported similar findings. HCFA reported that health
care expenditures reached a record high of more than one trillion dollars in 1997,
whereas the rate of growth (4.8%) was the slowest recorded in more than 35 years. At
13.5%, the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) has remained unchanged since
1994, whereas between 1960 to 1994 the percentage of GDP rose from 5.1% to 13.5%.
The slowed growth in national health care spending noted in 1994 was due to a slowed
growth rate of insurance premiums which has been attributed to the increasing
enrollment in lower-cost managed care plans6.
Consider the following scenario faced by a new family expecting their first child.
Under an indemnity plan, the family would be required to pay 20% coinsurance for nine
or more prenatal office visits. The cost of the hospital stay might include a deductible of
$500, for example, plus 20% of the remaining costs. Since well-baby care is not
traditionally covered under indemnity plans, the family would be also be responsible for
20% of these expenses as well. In comparison to an HMO plan, the same family might
pay a $10-$25 co-payment for pre-natal care, and similar co-payment for the hospital
stay and well-baby care visits. The out-of-pocket expenses are less burdensome in the
HMO plan compared to the indemnity plan. Affordability has played a significant role in
the popularity and growth experienced among managed care plans.
7s Health Care Finance Administration, Highlight of National Health Expenditures, 1998. http:llwww.HCFA.govlstatslnhe-
oact/
7 Levit, KR, et al. "Health Care Spending in 1994: Slowest in Decades" (Health Affairs. Summer 1996;15:130-44).
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In sum, the attractive attributes of managed care plans, including increased
access to preventive care, low out-of-pocket costs, and no claim forms, led to the
popularity and growth of managed care during the 80s and 90s. The federal government
introduced managed care health plans to both the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
Many cost-conscious employers embraced the concept of managed care and
encouraged their employees (through cost incentives or through limiting choice) to select
a managed care plan. As a result, enrollment in managed care plans has grown
tremendously over the past two decades.
Chapter 3:
Factors Contributing To Managed Care Backlash
As managed care plans gain an increasing foothold in the health care market, the
trend toward integrating the finance and delivery of care has generated concerns about
the implications for quality of care. There are fears that cost containment vehicles such
as capitation, physician incentives, and oversight activities have negatively influenced
physician practice behaviors to under-serve, or even deny care. This has lead to many
other controversial issues that have cast managed care under a black cloud. There is
concern that quality of care has suffered because managed care organizations have put
doctors in a tenuous position to have to consider profit in the same vane as the patient’s
best interest. The notion of "profit before the patient" has tainted the patient-physician
relationship and has instilled distrust in the system. The public has denounced managed
care, resulting in what is referred to as the ’backlash’.
As consumers of health care, patients feel entitled to health care services and
strongly believe that physicians should not be subject to HMO’s profit goals. The public
has demanded that their rights as patients be protected by law. This chapter will discuss
the facets of managed care that have contributed to the current state of managed care
backlash, including" corporate management of managed care companies, negative
media, public perceptions and confusion of managed care, changes in the socio-
demographics of the health care consumer, and employers’ sensitivity to price.
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Profit Motives of Health Care Organizations
In 1998, membership in for-profit HMOs totaled approximately 53.9 million
members, and represented nearly two-thirds of total HMO membership. The charter of
for-profit organizations is to maintain a desirable profit and/or satisfy its stakeholders.
Profits can be positively affected by increasing revenue streams (i.e., premiums from
membership) or by reducing costs (e.g., administrative fees, salaries, health care
services). The less money that a managed care organization spends on patient care,
the lower their premiums, and the more cash can be put aside and returned to
shareholders. Controlling expenses also affords marketability and membership
potential. Respondents surveyed in the 1998 HMO Industry Report rated price
competitiveness as the most important factors in retaining and generating enrollment
growth,z
Publicly traded managed care organizations calculate and publish a "medical
loss ratio" in their annual report. This ratio indicates the percentage of each premium
dollar spent on the delivery of health care, which, ironically, is regarded as a loss8. To
provide perspective, in the late 1970s, leading non-profit HMOs spent 94% of its
premiums on health care. The few non-profit HMOs that existed in the early 90s (e.g.,
Kaiser Permanente, Tufts, Harvard Community Health Plan) maintained their medical
loss ratio in and around the 90 percent mark. Conversely, it was not uncommon for
Interstudy, Interstudy Competitive Edge, HMO/ndustry Report 9.1, Minneapolis, MN, 1998. Survey results published in
Drug Benefit Trends, 11(7):11-12, 1999.
z8 Anders, George, Health Against Wealth, HMOs and the Breakdown of Medical Trust, Boston: Mariner Books, 1996, pg.
62.
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investor-owned managed care organizations to boast of medical loss ratios of 75% or
lower79.
Since managed care companies compete on the basis of price (in order to
increase market share), it is imperative that expenses are contained to a minimum. One
of the largest and most variable costs arise from physicians’ treatment decisions. Since
nearly all decisions regarding patient care are made at the discretion of the primary care
provider (PCP), managed care organizations have targeted financial incentives to deter
unnecessary or marginally necessary care. In extreme cases, managed care cost
containment strategies have conflicted with doctors’ decision to treat vis-a-vis
nondisclosure clauses and penalties contained in the physician contract with the health
plan. Naturally, this raises the question as to whether the role of care provider and
business manager is opposed, and moreover, to what extent this contention influences a
physician’s treatment decision.
The public’s dismay and the corporate management of health care is evident in
the increasing number of cases against managed care companies being brought to
court. In 1998, the Texas attorney general sued six HMOs accusing them of penalizing
doctors that did not limit patients’ medical care and illegally compensating those who did.
Each lawsuit said that the HMOs created conflicts of interest for doctors by giving them
budgets for certain services (e.g., hospital admissions) in order to maximize profits.
Doctors were given a percentage of the surplus if they came in under budget and were
z9 Anders, G. Ibid, p.62
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expected to compensate the HMOs if they went over budget. In January 1999, a $120
million civil suit was brought against Aetna U.S. Healthcare of California. The judgement
was in favor of the cancer patient, who had been delayed (or refused) certain
recommended cancer treatments, and later died. These are two examples exemplify
the public’s anger with the overriding profit motives of managed care organizations.
Also fueling the backlash of managed care is the publication of managed care
organization’s executives’ salaries. The public views this as unethical and insidious
because the money could have been spent on patient care, instead of going to high level
executives. To add to public outrage, even top executives of companies that failed, such
as Columbia/HCA (a hospital chain) and Oxford (an HMO), were rewarded with lucrative
severance packagesa2. When HMO executives decided that their mission was to make
as much money as possible, they also invited scorn and distrust from those on the
receiving end of health care, the public. A more overt sign of this backlash is the
decreasing value of managed care organizations’ stock during over the past year.
8Vertuno, James, "Attomey General Sues Six HMOs Accusing Illegal Contracts with Doctors", Associated Press,
12/16/98. Humana was accused of illegally penalizing doctors or physician groups up to $2,000 for each member who left
the HMO after a doctor advised them an alternative plan might provide better coverage. The lawsuits asked the court to
order the HMOs to pay civil penalties and stop the alleged practices.
81 Peterson, Mark A., Introduction: Politics, Misperception, or Apropos?, Journal of Health Policy, Politics, and Law, Vol.
24, No. 5, October 1999, pg. 875-76.
2 The Associate Press reported that the president of Columbia HCA Healthcare Corp. received a $10 million severance
package and that Oxford’s former chairman, Stephen Wiggins, would receive severance of up to three times his annual
salary plus bonuses for a total of more than $5 million.
50
Negative Media Coverage of Managed Care
Concerns of cost, quality and access have been heightened in the
public’s eye through increased media attention and unfavorable press of
managed care. The media has focused on the negative aspects of managed care
by featuring "horror stories" of people being denied life-saving care. The media
has played a role in contributing to general distrust in the health care system by
instilling lack of confidence that managed care can deliver quality care while
decreasing costs. This phenomenon is supported by the numerous newspaper
headlines and cover stories featured in Time Magazine (Playing the HMO Game:
Denied Viagra and, Inflamed by Horror Stories, Consumers Put Health Reform
Back on the Front Burner’S), U.S. News & World Report (Healing the Great
Divide: How Come Doctors and Patients Ended Up on Opposite Sides., How
HMOs Decide Your FateS),and USA Today (HMO Love Affair over?
Relationship Between Money, Health Hits Skids)6. While these stories may be
interesting reading material, they have contributed to the public’s negative image
of managed care.
Due to media’s reach, it is believed that such negativity may be
responsible for propagating the backlash of managed care7. A study was
Time, Playing the HMO Game: Denied Viagra and Inflamed by Horror Stories, Consumers Put Health Reform Back on
the Front Burner, July 13, 1998
4 U.S. News & World Report, Healing the Great Divide: How Come Doctors and Patients Ended Up on Opposite Sides?,
October 13, 1997.
8s U.S. News & World Report, How HMOs Decide Your Fate, March 9, 1998.
as USA Today, HMO Love Affair Over?. Relationship Between Money and Health Skids, October 20, 1999
87 Wilensky, G. What’s Behind the Public’s Backlash? Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 24 No. 5, October
1999
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conducted in 1998 to assess the potential bias of the media in its portrayal of
managed care. The findings pointed to a noticeable trend in the critical tone of
the coverage over time for the period spanning 1990 to 1997. In addition, the
study found that the most visible media sources had negative stories in more
than 50% of their managed care coverage, and that most coverage drew on
anecdotes88. This study provides empirical data to support the perception that
the media has contributed to the public’s negative view of managed care.
Public Perceptions of Managed Care
The Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) conducted a survey to
examine American confidence in managed care both now and in the future, as
well as their attitudes toward health care reform. Contrary to what has been
portrayed by the media, the 1999 survey indicated that the majority of Americans
are extremely or very satisfied with the quality of medical care they have
received. 89 However, the level of satisfaction varies by type of health care plan,
with the highest levels of satisfaction taking place for those in fee-for-service
plans, as shown in Table 1. Similar results were reported in 1998:80 to 93
percent of people polled stated that they were satisfied with their health care
88 Brodie, M., Brady, and Altman, D.E., Media Coverage of Managed Cam: Is Them a Negative Bias? Health Affairs
1998; 17(1):9-25
89 Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1999 EBRI Health Confidence Survey, October 20, 1999. The EBRI is a private,
nonprofit, nonpartisan public policy research organization. The survey was conducted through 20 minute interviews with
1001 individuals ages 21 and older. Random dialing was used. The sample yields a statistical precision of plus or minus
3 percentage points (within 95 percent certainty).
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plan, with traditional plans yielding a higher score (approximately ten percent)
compared to managed care plans9’9
Percentage of Extremely or Very Satisfied with Aspects of Health Care Received
Over the Past Two Years, by Type of Health Plan
Source: 1999 EBRI Health Confidence Survey
Table I
The survey also showed a high level of confidence in the health care
system, a measure that was quantified through questions about confidence in
their pharmacist to fill their prescription correctly, confidence in their plan to have
a specialist visit approved, or to choose their own doctor or hospital. However,
less than half of the respondents were very confident that their doctor’s treatment
9o Time/Cable News Network (CNN). 1998 Poll. New York: Time Magazine, CNN, June-July
91 Washington Post/ABC. 1998 Poll. Washington, DC: Washington Post, ABC, July-July
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would be based upon their health care needs rather than the cost of their care, or
that their doctor was up-to-date on information about medicine and medical
conditions. These aspects of health care express potential concerns, since they
were not necessarily founded on first hand experiences of the respondents.
The EBRI study offers interesting and compelling points about America’s
perception of managed care. First, in spite of lower overall satisfaction with
managed care, there seems to be confusion about what constitutes managed
care. The survey reported that even though nearly 87% of Americans are
covered by some type of managed care plan, 54% of the HMO enrollees
surveyed said that they had never been in a managed care plan. This finding
points toward the public’s confusion over managed care, and furthermore,
indicates a lack of awareness of participating in a managed care plan92.
Secondly, the general lack of confidence in doctors’ treatment decisions conveys
the public’s uncertainty and distrust of the physician-patient relationship within
managed care.
In 1998, the Kaiser Family Foundation and the Harvard School of Public Health
conducted a poll entitled, National Survey of American’s Views on the Consumer
Protections Debate. In this survey responses were collected to assess the public’s
attitude and experiences with managed care, as well as consumer protection
92 1999 EBRI Survey, ibid. Note: 21% of respondents identified themselves as enrolled in a managed care plan, and were
also less satisfied with their plan compared to those respondents who were not aware that they were enrolled in a
managed care plan.
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shape public opinion, and has negatively influenced approximately 18% of the public’s
opinion of managed care.
The Kaiser Family Foundation survey underscored other negative perceptions of
managed care. Nearly 58% of the respondents were worried that if they become sick,
their health plan would be more concerned about saving money than providing the best
treatment (this percentage varied by type of plan, however, those enrolled in HMOs were
more concerned than their fee-for-service counterparts). Other negative views
expressed about managed care included: decreased time that doctors spend with
patients, decreased access to specialists, and decreased quality of care for the sick.
Finally, over half of those surveyed stated that managed care had not produced health
care savings9’=.
How is it then, that there can be high levels of satisfaction (as indicated by the
EBRI survey) coupled with negativity about so many aspects of managed care? One
interpretation might be that many people do have complaints but have reported them to
their health plan and were satisfied with the response. Lacking this data and insight
makes inferences difficult. Another more likely interpretation is that those expressing
unfavorable opinions about managed care formed their view on the basis of someone
else’s experience, or were influenced by the media. In either case, it is not surprising
that nearly three-quarters of the respondents supported comprehensive consumer
protection legislation including provisions such as increased access to specialists,
emergency care, and suing their health plan. However, interesting to note is that
Ibid, Kaiser Family Foundation, National Survey ofAmericans’ Views on the Consumer Protections Debate
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support for such legislation dropped to 46% when the potential for cost increase was
raised.
Professional Opinions of Managed Care
Professionals who administer care have voiced their thoughts on practicing in an
industry that has become dominated by managed care in a poll entitled, "Survey of
Physician and Nurses". Designed and conducted by the Kaiser Family
Foundation/Harvard School of Public Health, the survey found that almost nine out of ten
doctors say that their patients have experienced some type of denial of coverage of
services over the passed two years9. Across all type of services, doctors reported that
between one-third and two-thirds of denial of coverage resulted (in their judgement) in a
"serious" decline in a patient’s health status" (most frequently for mental health,
specialist referrals, and diagnostic tests and procedures). Unlike the way in which the
public’s view of managed care is shaped, this study found that 79% of physicians’ view
of managed care is based on their first-hand experience as a doctor (see Figure 5)96.
Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University. Survey of Physician and Nurses, July 1999. The survey was
administered by mail to a random sample of 1053 physician and 768 registered nurses (drawn from the AMA’s Masterfile).
Data were stratified by PCP and specialist. Data presented on the consequences of health plan denials represent
judgements, not clinical reviews. The margin of sampling error is +/- 3% for the physician survey and +/- 4% for nurses.
Ibid.
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teaching (58.9 percent) and had reduced their income (55.8 percent). Overall, 46.6
percent of faculty members, 26.7 percent of residency-training directors, and 42.7
percent of department chairs reported that the message they delivered to students about
managed care was negative.
Clearly, physician and nurses have concerns or have formed unfavorable
opinions about managed care which and are largely shaped by their own practical
experiences as health providers. When asked if they would be worried that a health plan
would be more concerned about saving money than determining the best treatment for a
sick family member, 46 percent of the physician respondents (50% of nurse
respondents) said that they would be very worried98.
Socio-Demographics of the Health Care Consumer
The number of educated people and the level of education has increased
dramatically over the last 30 years. Generally, the average consumer is better
educated, and has access to data to make informed buying decisions. Education and
information equates to knowledge. Knowledge is empowering --it fosters a certain self
confidence that has lead consumers to be assertive in their purchasing experiences,
from buying cars and books, to purchasing health care and participating in their
treatment decisions.
The double-income families prevalent of today leave very little or no time to shop.
Families are burdened with child and elder-care responsibilities, work, school, etc. and
Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University. Survey of Physician and Nurses, ibid.
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value their free time. Consumers demand choice, convenience and expect quality-
attributes that seem logical, but are often difficult to implement in concert.
Convenience in health care is a factor that may be shunned as an attribute
necessary of a grocery store, not of a doctors’ office, albeit health care is probably the
largest service industry in the United States. Convenience translates into ease of
access, hours of operation, location, wait time, and integration of services. Taken
together, these attributes can positively impact important things such as increased levels
of immunization and preventive care, appropriate use of services, centralization of
services to cater to the multi-faceted needs of those with chronic diseases and
compliance with treatment regimens. When there isn’t convenience, people are more
likely to defer preventive care and/or seek care when an emergency arises both
instances are costly and potentially inappropriate (and does not contribute toward
increasing health status).
Well-informed consumers have changed their relationships with doctors. Rather
than rely solely on the knowledge of their doctor, they do research to understand their
illness, treatment options, and outcomes. If they don’t confer with their doctor’s opinion,
they may seek another opinion until they get what they are looking for.
Advertising is now permitted by health plans, hospitals, and pharmaceutical
companies (direct to consumer marketing, or DTC), and has been used to raise the
public’s awareness of their specialized services or pharmaceuticals and are used very
simply as a competitive marketing tool. As a result, consumers, now more than ever
before, have become more acutely aware of their choices. They ask for, and expect
brand name drugs or the highest tech procedure to be used by their physician.
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Information on drug therapies, treatment options, surgeries, etc. are all fairly accessible
to most consumers via the Internet.
Finally, the activist culture of the 60’s and 70’s was instrumental in shaping this
generation’s views about the legal system, and about protection of their rights. As these
baby boomers age and more enter the health care system more frequently, they are
exercising their political clout by proclaiming that their rights as consumers of health care
be protected.
Employer’s Sensitivity to Price
Health insurance premiums increased by double digits in the late 80’s and early
90’s, during a time when the economy was experiencing a recession. Employers were
less willing and able to offset the cost of premiums to their employees and began to look
for alternatives to the open-ended fee-for-service plans. Some employers passed off
increases in the form of larger deductibles and higher coinsurance amounts. Other
employers strategically priced their plans to make the managed care plans most
appealing to their employees. The lower out-of-pocket costs and smaller monthly
contribution toward premiums was intended to entice employees to enroll in the less
costly managed care plans.
Throughout the 80’s and into the 90’s, employers began to employ strategies to
shift employees from expensive indemnity plans into less costly managed care plans.
The central driver of managed care was a reduction in the amount of freedom of choice
that patients enjoyed and expected in the ’free-for-all’ world of indemnity insurance. By
moving into a managed care plan, members submitted to having their care "managed" or
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regulated by the health plan or HMO. In doing so, they sacrificed unbridled choice
among providers and services that was otherwise the norm in the indemnity plan. The
loss of choice and the impingement of the managed care organization on the doctor-
patient relationship are two important factors that have contributed to managed care’s
backlash.
Chapter 4:
The Present State of Managed Care
Advocates of managed care believe that HMOs, by virtue of their design, offer an
ideal mix of cost containment, access and quality features, including: pre-paid care,
absence of claim forms, reduced financial barriers, increased access to preventive care,
and coordination and continuity of care through a primary care physician. These
attributes have made HMOs an appealing choice to consumers, the government, health
plans, and employers alike as witnessed in the fivefold increase in HMO enrollment
since 1982.
Over the past decade managed care has gained support by large employers and
by the government, the two largest purchasers of health care. Health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) and point of service (POS) plans were both introduced to the
Medicare population during the past five years (currently, there are 6.2 million Medicare
recipients enrolled in managed care). In the mid-’90s, employers began to offer HMOs
to their Medicare eligible retirees to control the high costs often generated by an elderly
population. In total, approximately 116 million people are enrolled in managed care
plans (which includes the full spectrum of PPO, POS and HMO plans). As of July
1998, a total of 78.8 million people were enrolled in some 652 HMOsTM. The number of
HMO enrollees continues to increase, although the growth rate has slowed over the past
== Anders, G. HMOs Plan Pdce Cuts Averaging 1.2% Amid Lower Costs, Rising Membership, The Wall Street Journal,
January 1995
loo Barents Study completed for the American Association of Health Plans (AAHP)
lol InterStudy. The InterStudy Competitive Edge: HMO Industry Report 9.1, 1999.
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plans. By 1998, the market shares nearly reversed, with managed care plans
representing over 87% of the market. In essence, the industry has come full circle, with
implications that can only be postulated.
Managed care has been credited with controlling the inflation-ridden costs of the
’80’s via HMOs lower rates of inpatient hospitalization which resulted in their overall
lower expenses’’6. It is also the belief that early on, HMOs reaped the benefits of
"adverse selection". This term describes the effect of low risk individuals migrating from
traditional indemnity plans to less costly HMO plans. The theory holds that high-risk
individuals, unwilling to submit to the restrictive provisions of a managed care plan,
remained in the more costly indemnity plans. In effect, the indemnity plans were left
with a larger proportion of high-risk individuals and fewer people over which to spread
the risk. As a result, indemnity plan costs rose at a faster rate than the managed care
plan, as shown in Figure 7 on the next page.
lo4 Manning, W.G., Leibowitz, A., Goldberg, G.A, Rogers, W.H., Newhouse, J.P., A Controlled Trial of the Effect of a
Prepaid Group Practice on Use of Services, NEJM 1984; 310:1505-10.
los Brook, R.H., et al., Use of Medical Care in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Medical Care 1986;24:Suppl:S1-87
lo6 Luft, H., How Do Health Maintenance Organizations Achieve Their Savings? NEJM 1978;298:1336-1342.
loz Pauly and Nicholson, ibid.
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At the end of 1999, health care costs were reported to have increased by 7.2% from
1998, with premiums projected to increase an additional 7.5% in 2000. The impact for
small companies (i.e., those with 50 or less employees) was more severe, having
experienced a 13.8% increase between 1998 and 1999.
Unlike prior years, employers have reportedly chosen to swallow the additional
cost of health care. This is probably due to the influence of a tight labor market, and is a
tactic to retain existing employees. Historically, employers have shifted cost increases
off to employees in the form of higher premium contributions, or increased coinsurance
amounts.
The HMO industry has also felt the pinch of increasing health care costs. In
1999, the HMO industry experienced a 45% decline in profitability (a collective net loss
of $1.25 billion) representing a departure from typical positive performance2. This
trend points to the difficulty of sustaining a profit in an industry that has made a business
out of caring for sick people. With managed care profits on the decline, investors have
pulled out of the market, which in prior years generated a highly favorable return.
As managed care has taken a commanding position in the marketplace, there is
growing fear that HMOs will continue to squeeze costs in order to return a profit to
shareholders. There is concern that cost containment vehicles such as capitation,
physician incentives, gag clauses, and oversight activities will influence physicians to
under-serve, or even deny care. Americans drew a rhetorical ’line in the sand’ with
William M. Mercer, Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans, 1999
A.M. Best Co., "1998 HMO Profitability" (a report based on data from more than 600 HMOs), December 1999.
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managed care plans on the one side, and consumers of health care on the other. The
public has cried out for legal protection of their rights whereas health plans vehemently
oppose any type of government regulation. The other players, not sure of the
implications of managed care policy, have been left to choose sides in the debate over a
patient bill of rights.
Chapter 5:
Legislation as a Vehicle for Reform
Health care reform has occurred piecemeal at the state level and has also been
mandated by the federal government. In addition, the health care industry has been
’revolutionized’ by the natural forces of the marketplace, and the demands of its players.
This chapter reviews both state and federal health care reform that have taken place
over the past decade. Since Clinton’s first proposal for global health care reform failed,
many states have taken matters into their own hands and have implemented a
patchwork of managed care laws. At the same time the federal government has devised
their own version of a patient bill of rights, with different provisions and scope of
application. Key provisions of the major pieces of patient protection legislation will be
reviewed and discussed herein.
Health Care Reform in the Last Decade
In the early 90s, the Clinton Administration proposed to restructure the health
care system through three broad goals: first, provide secure, uninterrupted health
coverage for all Americans, secondly, place 37 million uninsured in a health plan, and
113third, cut the rate of medical inflation The Clinton proposal was to be accomplished
by providing a standard and affordable set of benefits to more working Americans and to
the uninsured. Up to 80% of the premium cost would be paid for by employers and
113 The Hartford Courant, "A Primer: Clinton’s Health Care Reform Plan, 1993
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ceilings would be placed on premium increases if costs were not lowered through the
course of market competition. At the core of Clinton’s health care reform proposal
was the creation of buyers’ market through the establishment of health insurance
purchasing cooperatives (HIPCs). HIPCs were to foster what was first coined by one of
the president’s health care advisors, Alain Enthoven, as "managed competition".
Health plans were to compete for membership on the basis of price and quality. The
HIPCs were also charged with monitoring and improving quality and service.
Guidelines, established by a national health board would promote quality of care, would
also result in efficiencies and ultimately lower costs. Health care plans would be held
accountable for providing services and coverage under these established guidelines6.
Managed competition seemed logical in concept, but by and large, the Clinton
Administration’s complex proposal for re-organizing the health care delivery system
never came to fruition. Under Clinton’s model, health plans were to improve quality and
consumers were to dictate and shape the market. However, the consumers that drive
the market are also the biggest purchasers of health care large employers and the
government (Medicare and Medicaid) and were more focused on price, and secondarily
on quality. The cost-consciousness of these players bore a tremendous influence on the
health care industry, as was discussed in Chapter 3.
Desperate to contain costs, health plans and employers began to make
drastic plan design changes to high cost or high frequency benefits such as
maternity and mental health. Consequently, legislation was called upon to
114 The New York Times National, "A New Framework for Health Care", September 23, 1993
115 Enthoven, AC. Consumer-Choice Health Plan: A National Health Insurance Proposal Based on Regulated
Competition in the Pdvate Sector. NEJM 298:709-720, 1978
116 The New York Times National, ibid.
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protect individuals from seemingly unfair or harsh decisions. In response to what
became referred to as "drive through deliveries", many states began to mandate
minimum lengths of stay (48 hours) for maternity admissions. Similarly, advocate
groups cried out against the unfair limits placed upon mental health benefits,
claiming that restrictions should be the same as those on physical illness. The
Mental Health Parity Act of 1997 was the government’s mandate that required
employers to lift dollar limits (i.e., annual or per service maximums) from mental
health benefits so that they were equivocal to other medical benefits.
Since Clinton’s proposal, health care reform has not entered the political arena,
nor has it been as publicly charged a topic until the mid-term elections at the end of 1998
and throughout 1999. Despite the lack of global reform, the health care industry has
revolutionized itself in response to advancements in technology and medical knowledge.
The industry has also responded to pressures from employers and the government to
contain costs; to patient demands for choice and access to high-tech care, and to
physicians’ desire to retain their autonomy in delivering uninterrupted health care.
State Legislation
At the local level, there is significant interest in the increased regulation of health
plans. Accordingly, a number of states have implemented a variety of managed care
laws, varying in scope and depth. Many states have introduced patient protection laws
aimed at safeguarding rights of managed care consumers. Examples of some of the key
managed care issues debated at the state level include: health plan liability, external
review, mental health parity, privacy of medical information, out-of-network access, and
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collective bargaining for physicians. A brief description of these main provisions is
summarized in Table 2.
Key Managed Care Policy Issues at the State Level
Provision
Health plan liability
External review
Practice of medicine
I medical necessity
Mental health parity
Privacy of medical
information
Point of Service I
Description
Allows health plan members to file suit against a health plan in a
state court. Individuals would be granted access to non-
economic damage awards if the plan’s denial caused them
harm.
Allows individuals who have concerns with a coverage decision
(medical necessity or experimental) to appeal to an independent
review panel of medical experts.
Makes physicians the sole determinant of what should be or
should not be covered, not the health plan. Establishes a
universal definition of medical necessity based on "generally
accepted principles of medicine".
Mandates that coverage for mental health-related services and
treatments be the same as physical conditions. Federal act
currently focuses only on annual dollar limits.
Medical records and treatment discussions are private.
Establishes requirements for obtaining authorization to
use/disclose information for purposes of treatment, payment,
and/or health plan operations (i.e., research).
Provisions including coverage of out-of-network providers,
continuity of care, and direct access/standing referrals toAccess Issues
Collective
bargaining for
physicians
specialists.
Allows individual physicians to collectively negotiate contractual
terms with health plans.
Table 2
117 Adapted from United HealthGroup, Public and Government Affairs, Federal & State Affairs, Second Quarter 1999
73
Every state, with the exception of Wyoming, introduced some type of managed
care legislation during 1999. Managed care reform took precedence over other
important topics such as tobacco settlements, children’s health care programs, and
regulation of long-term care. The downside to this is that in the absence of a federal
framework, a patchwork of inconsistent state laws regulating health plans has been
developed. Below is a summary of 1999 state activity with regard to the managed care
provisions outlined in Table 2.
999 State Activity of Select Managed Care Laws 8
Of all of the pieces of proposed legislation, health plan liability, or the ability to sue a
health plan, remains the most politically charged topic. In 1999, there were a total of 35
states that proposed and debated health plan liability, and only two states, Georgia and
United HealthGroup, Public and Government Affairs, Federal & State Affairs, Second Quarter 1999 Update, May,
1999.
74
California, have enacted legislation that year. Texas was the only other state with such
liability legislation.
Texas’ liability law was enacted in 1997 and allows patients to sue their health
plan for harm inflicted upon them as a result of a claims administrator, health care
advisor, private review agent, or "any other person from a managed care entity’s" failure
to use "ordinary diligence".2 The law in Texas requires a patient to make full use of
external review procedures prior to bringing a case to court. Also under the law, the
patient can sue for compensatory damages but not punitive damages.
Federal Legislation
State legislators and Congress have been debating nearly identical health care
policy issues. After endless debate, the Senate and the House of Representatives
passed two patient bills of rights in the fall of 1999. The two bills that were passed are
very different in scope and application. The Senate bill is more limited than the House
version in that it does not include the controversial provision of health plan liability and
that it only applies to self-funded, employer-sponsored health plans. The House bill
pertains to all health plans, individual and group, regardless of how they are sponsored.
The House bill expands the scope of ERISA to allow patients to sue their health plans in
state court with access to unlimited damages, provided that the patient first uses the
plan’s internal and external review processes.
Federal and State Affairs Update, Ibid.
2o ibid.
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Medical Necessity
The basis for proposing a statutory definition of medical necessity is centered on
quality. The goal is to protect patients from being denied care that may not be covered
under their health plan, provided that it is deemed to be medically necessary by their
physician. As mentioned earlier, employers who self-fund their health benefits have the
prerogative (and protection by Federal ERISA laws) to make discretionary coverage
decisions without intervention from state insurance mandates. Thus, under the provision
of medical necessity, the locus of decision-making regarding coverage would shift from
the health plan administrator or employer to the physician. It does this by replacing the
health plans’ contractual definitions of medical necessity with a community standard
definition.
Statutory definition of medical necessity is typically based on "generally accepted
principles of medicine". This broad definition reflects community standards of care,
which means that its definition will vary in its interpretation depending on practice
patterns that constitute the norm for a given region26. Legislative proposals that include
medical necessity seek to establish a universal definition ’medical necessity’ in statute
and would preclude health plans from arbitrarily interfering with a prudent physician’s
decision of whether a service, procedure or treatment should be administered2z. Under
this provision, the physician becomes the sole decision-maker regarding what should or
should not be covered.
126 12e UnitedHealth Group, Talking Points: Statutory Definitions of Medical Necessity, July 1999
127 UnitedHealth Group, ibid.
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The Democratic proposal seeks to guarantee that a patient’s doctor, not the
patient’s managed care plan, will decide what treatment is necessary. The Republican
law does not include a provision for medical necessity, advocating instead, a written
internal grievance process for complaints of treatment decisions.
Health Plan Liability
The provision of health plan liability has been proposed as a means to hold
health plans accountable for wrongful or inappropriate decisions to deny or delay
treatment that result in harm to a patient. Currently, most consumers who receive their
health insurance through an employer-sponsored plan cannot recover any
compensatory (i.e., lost wages) or punitive (i.e., pain and suffering) damages. This is
due to the exemption of these plans from liability, as granted through ERISA.
There have been many anecdotes written about by the popular press. For
example, consider the following scenario: a 49 year old male, Mr. Jones, experiencing a
severe headache and high blood pressure, goes to the emergency room. Upon
examination, the ER physician recommends that the man be admitted to the hospital,
whereas his managed care doctor, via phone consultation, determines that an admission
is not necessary. As Mr. Jones leaves the ER to return home, he suffers the first
symptoms of a stroke in his truck, which consequently leaves his left side partly
paralyzed and renders him partially disabled for life. Mr. Jones decides to sue his health
plan for damages that he has suffered as a result of the managed care’s decision not to
admit him to the hospital. He is an auto mechanic by trade and will not be able to work
in the same capacity as he did prior to the stroke. Mr. Jones finds out that his case will
be pushed from the state court up to a federal court, where ERISA laws would protect
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his employer-sponsored health plan from nearly all liability, limiting his recourse to
recouping the cost of the denied treatment, and court fees. The impetus behind health
plan liability and the limitations currently under ERISA laws are discussed in the next
section.
Health Plan Liability and ERISA Preemption
Claims against a health plan are currently barred by ERISA laws, which in effect
shield them from malpractice when the health care coverage is provided through an
employer. The reasoning for this is that health plans administer health care coverage in
accordance with the benefit plan design parameters. Health plans can influence the
level of care provided to a patient through the determination and interpretation of health
plans benefit provisions, or by following practice guidelines or standards of care. It holds
then, that health plans do not directly administer care, they administer coverage and
therefore cannot be held liable under ERISA laws. A patient’s recourse when covered
by an ERISA protected plan is limited to recouping the cost of the denied treatment plus
court costs and legal fees, if anything at all.
The current system of health plan liability under ERISA essentially follows
contract law. Under a contract model of liability, damages are limited to what would
have occurred if the contract had been kept. Furthermore, remedies are designed to
compensate the injured party by protecting their economic interests, but are not intended
to punish the other party from breaching of the contract. Tort law, on the other hand,
aims at compensating people for injuries, and reflects society’s judgements about how
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people should behave toward each other28. As such, remedies for breach under tort
law include compensatory for the defendant’s wrongdoing, and may also include punitive
damages to punish malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent behavior29.
Another important aspect of ERISA is the preemption from state law ’causes of
action’. This means that if a malpractice case were brought to a state court, the state is
precluded from providing any different or additional legal remedies as determined by
ERISA. The interpretation by the Supreme Court in the 1987 decision in the Pilot Life
case is often cited in ERISA cases. According to the Supreme Court decision, remedies
for injuries due to payment denial are preempted because they affect plan
administration, not quality of care decisions. Recently, however, courts have begun to
distinguish between a plan’s decision regarding business administration cases
("coverage cases"), which are preempted under ERISA, and disputes over a plan’s direct
involvement in the delivery of care ("quality cases") in which damages are not
preempted. Many federal courts are indicating that managed care can be sued in state
courts for issues of quality of care.
For many Americans receiving health coverage through their company, ERISA
provides the only recourse to sue their health plan, which will not compensate for
economic (compensatory) or non-economic (punitive) damages. The clause included in
the Democrats’ bill assures that all patients, even those with employer-sponsored health
128 Mermim, S., Law and the Leoal System: An Introduction, second edition, Little,Brown, and Company, Boston and
Toronto, 1982, p. xix.
129 California Health Policy Roundtable on Health Plan Liability, pp. 2-3, Sacramento, Calinfornia, February 25, 1999.
1o UnitedHealth Group Public and Government Affairs, "UnitedHealth Groups’ Position on Health Plan Liability", April 20,
1999.
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care coverage, can sue their health plan for compensatory and punitive damages if they
are injured by a managed care organization’s wrongful decision to withhold or deny
treatment. This would be accomplished by expanding current ERISA laws to allow
cases to be determined in state courts. Senate Republicans, on the other hand, defer to
an external appeals process whereby grievances are assessed and recourse
determined by an independent review board rather than a lawyer. The bipartisan bill
allows individuals to sue their health plan, but bars from punitive damages when the plan
complies with the external reviewer’s decision. Some would argue that under this bill,
the health plans could calculate in advance the liability cost of doing harm, versus the
uncertainty if punitive damages were permitted.
It seems that the stark differences in these bills will ultimately serve to slow the
process of negotiating a final version of a Patients’ Bill of Rights within the Senate. In
any event, there are significant political implications in the event that Congress seeks to
preempt state laws in any federal legislation. The potential implications for each of the
major players in the health care industry is the focal point of the next chapter.
Chapter 6:
Assessing the Implications of a Federally Legislated Patient Bill of Rights
Most Americans feel that the pendulum has swung too far in favor of managed
care organizations. However, patients, physicians, employers and health plans have
voiced different opinions and varying levels of support for the two major pieces of
legislation under consideration. Regardless of which bill prevails, the next wave of
change is likely to have a profound impact on each of the players in the health care
industry.
Patients and physicians (including the AMA) advocate legislation to protect
consumers’ rights and to return physicians to the helm of medical decision making.
Conversely, managed care organizations, large businesses, including the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, are expected to mount major opposition campaigns to halt legislative
proposals in Congress. Collectively, this group claims that premium hikes will result
from patients suing their health plans and that quality will not increase in a defensive
atmosphere.
Although the scope of a final version of a patient’s bill of rights is unclear, much
of the debate and discussion has been centered on the most controversial provisions,
including: health plan liability, medical necessity, and external appeals. Patients,
physicians, employers, and health plans have publicly responded to how managed care
legislation would affect their role and in turn, may impact the health care industry at
large. These viewpoints are the purview of this chapter.
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Patients’ Perspective
By and large, the backlash responses to managed care stems from the public’s
fear of the uncertain future of managed care and their ability to obtain quality careTM.
From this perspective, the public is reacting to unfounded fears2 and is seeking to
protect what they fear they may loose. Furthermore, the public does not feel that they
are served by current standards for patient protection within managed care. In effect the
public would benefit from some assurances that managed care plans will "play fair".
Educating the public about internal grievance processes and implementing standards for
external review appeals would be useful steps toward achieving this goal.
Consumers’ trust has been shaken because of signals from the media managed
care may be sacrificing quality health care in lieu of profits. Many believe that the media
has conscientiously chosen to sensationalize anecdotal stories in which people have
been injured or even have died because they were denied necessary care. Cost-
conscious HMOs have been portrayed as the villain of the health care industry.
Alternatively, the media can argue that they are serving the public by advocating issues
and concerns about managed care. Either way, the negative publicity has had a hand in
shaping the public’s view about managed care, as indicated in the results published by
the Kaiser Family Foundation Survey (see Figure 4).
Patients and consumer advocacy groups such as Families USA, largely back the
Democratic patient bill of rights. In addition to being able to sue your health plan and
131 Blendon R., et al. Understanding the Managed Care Backlash. Health Affairs 17(4):80-94.
132 Ibid. According to the authors, there is little persuasive empirical evidence that demonstrates that quality of care has
deteriorated because of managed care.
lzz Wilensky, G. ibid, p.1018.
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allowing physicians to make medical necessity decisions, the Senate Democrat’s bill
proposes to eliminate nearly all of managed care’s cost containment strategies that have
contributed to its success, including: direct access to specialists, mandatory point of
service offering, emergency room coverage, coverage of non-formulary drugs (when
indicated), and direct access to OB/GYNs and pediatricians.
A 1998 Barents Group/KPMG Peat Marwick study analyzed the major provisions
of the Democrat’s patient bill of rights4. The study, which was performed for an
insurance lobby, derived cost estimates from the Congressional Office Budget. The
Barents Group study found that premiums would increase between:
2.7% 8.6% if health plans are exposed to greater malpractice liability,
2.2% 6.9% if utilization review is deemed to be a medical treatment
decision,
4.1% 6.1% if plans are prohibited from determining medical necessity.
Taken together, an aggressive estimate of only three of the managed care
provisions has the potential to raise premiums by 21.6%. While this bill has all of the
attractive patient appeals (access, freedom of choice, ability to sue) it clearly would
come about at a large cost to society. The EBRI survey showed that three-quarters of
Americans support the notion of consumer protection legislation, however, when
potential consequences such as cost increases or employers dropping coverage are
Barents Group/KPMG Peat Marwick, study results as published in Managed Care Magazine, July 28, 1998.
The New York Times, Comparing Patient Bill of Rights Proposals, May 7, 1999.
http:llwww.nytimes.comllibrarylfinanciallSundayl
87
mentioned, support declines. The public would be better served from a clearer
understanding of the potential implications, particularly in the context of what the
implications are to each individual’s pocketbook.
On the other hand, the Consumers Union, a non-profit publisher of Consumer
Reports magazine and an advocacy group for the public, supports the bipartisan House
bill that was passed in October 1999. The Consumer Union stated that this bill
represented the most comprehensive bill that extends these protections to the millions of
Americans with private health insurance coverage6. The bipartisan managed care
reform bill provides an external appeals process so that when an HMO makes a
treatment decision, an outside review board can determine whether the health plan’s
decision wrongfully delayed, terminated, or denied care. At the same time, the
Consumers Union denounced the Senate’s version of the patient bill of rights by pointing
out that health plans can choose the outside entity that appoints the reviewer for the
patient’s claim. The Consumers Union felt this to be inappropriate and equated it to the
"fox guarding the hen house". The bill precludes external appeals over denials of
treatments that cost less than $1,000, discouraging members from exercising their right
for an appeal. Lastly, the Senate bill was put down by the Consumers Union because it
excludes 113 million Americans from holding their managed care plan accountable for its
decisions, through its lack of a health plans liability provision.
1 Hahn, Adrienne, "Consumers Union Applauds Passage of Managed Care Reform Bill But Cites Sedous Concerns
About Access Package", Consumer Union Press Release, Thursday, October 7, 1999. The Consumers Union, publishers
of Consumer Reports magazine, is an independent, nonprofit testing, educational, and informational organization serving
only consumers.
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Employers’ Perspective
Employers represent the single largest purchaser of health care (an estimated
125 million people are enrolled in self-insured plans), and as stated earlier, employers’
general concern with health care is cost first, quality and access second. From a cost
perspective, The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has published different estimates if
the Democrat’s version of the patient bill of rights (including the right to sue) were
adopted and implemented. In July 1999, the CBO estimated that premiums would
increase by 4.8% and that under the proposed legislation, the incremental cost per
enrolled individual would be $9 per month (or $108 per year) or $22 per month per family
($264 per year)7. Earlier in the year, the CBO had estimated an increase of only
1.2%8. Furthermore, Democrats assume that employers will pick up the majority of the
additional cost, which has employers very vehemently opposed to this bill. On the other
hand, the Senate Republican bill was estimated to increase premiums by less than one
percent (0.8%), or about $40 over a five year period for a family, according to the
CBO139. Either way, employers see an increase in their health care costs, which would
be on top of double-digit increases projected for the next five years4. The cost
implication of implementing a patient bill of rights has spurred obvious reactions from the
business arena, through which a large majority of the group health insurance is funded.
The small employers would suffer most from increased health premiums. Small
employers’ response to such legislation will bear consequences to the nearly 40 percent
137 Karl, Jonathon, Senate Democrats, GOP Square Off on Patients’ Rights, CNN Interactive, July 12, 1999
18 Comparing Patient BN of Rights Proposals, The New York Times, May 7, 1999
13 MacDonald, John A., "Senate Debate Could Change the Nation’s Path in Health Care", The Hartford Courant, Volume
CLXI, Number 193, July 12, 1999
14o Meyer, Michael, Oh No, Here We Go Again, Newsweek, December 14, 1998
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of U.S. workers for which they currently provide health care coverage. The cost of
health care may become increasingly unaffordable and may elicit employers to scale
back coverage, pass the majority of the price increase to their employees (higher
premiums or coinsurance amounts), or drop coverage altogether.
For large employers such as the Connecticut-based Pitney Bowes, the Medical
Director explained the rationale behind why Federal legislation of managed care would
be slow moving, and the potential implications:
"Employers moved to a D.C. (i. e., government) strategy for pension plans
(i. e., ERISA) because of increasing costs and increasing administrative
hassles. The same factors are present for employers with respect to
health benefits. In particular, costs are expected to rise more quickly over
the next few years than they have over the last several years. A
downturn in the economy would also drive a move to D.C. for health
benefits.
There will be a tremendous societal impact of a large-scale trend to D.C.,
for example it will create a great deal of "medical poverty" as individuals
cannot afford the increasing costs of care. This will force public policy
intervention, some sort of govemment-sponsored, baseline health benefit
program, which is an unpopular idea in most quarters. Fear of this
outcome may slow movement toward a D.C. solution. We are likely to
see continued turbulence and gnashing of teeth over the next several
years, as providers and hospitals find it more and more difficult to remain
profitable".
141 Mahoney, Jack, M.D., Medical Director, Pitney Bowes, October 9, 1999 phone conversation.
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Physicians’ Perspective
In the first half of 1999, the American Medical Association (AMA) spent over
$200,000 in advertising fees142 to fund print ads with tag lines such as: "Criminals all
have rights. Why don’t patients?’’4. This is an attempt to counter the insurance industry
blitz aimed at influencing the public’s perception that the horror stories do not represent
reality144. The AMA has publicly backed the Democrats’ version of the patient bill of
rights because it restores their autonomy through the medical necessity provision,
provides external appeals and makes them binding on health plans, permits patient
access to specialists, and doesn’t interrupt existing relationships with their patients4s.
The AMA has withheld support for the Republican bill due to the lack of venues for
patient recourse via the right to sue for medical malpractice, and would override patient
protection laws already enacted in 43 states.
The AMA stands grounded in their position on a patient bill of rights. Exemplified
in a February 24, 1998 letter to Richard Huber, President and CEO of Aetna US
Healthcare, the AMA stated concerns about their physician’s contract provisions in the
following areas:
142 MacDonald, John A., "Senate Debate Could Change the Nation’s Path in Health Care", The Hartford Courant, Volume
CLXI, Number 193, July 12, 1999
143 CNN Interactive, HMO Debate: What’s In It For You?, July 29, 1999. Http:llcnn.comlhealth199071121patients.rightsl
144 Morris, James, HMO Debate: What’s in it for you?, CNN Interactive, July 12, 1999.
45 Fortin, Frank, "Senate to Consider Patient Protection Bill in September", The Monthly Member Publication of the
Massachusetts Medical Society, September 1998
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1) "Aetna interferes with physicians’ ability to make medical decisions for their
patients by retaining the authority to decide what services are medically
necessary,
2) there are no appeal processes whereby a physician can challenge the plan’s
denial of a treatment the physician recommends,
3) the contracts contain gag clauses that can be used to automatically
terminate a physician who informs a patient about a treatment option that is
not covered by the plan, even when the physician believes that treatment is
best for the patient, and,
4) the contracts violate patient-physician confidentiality by giving the plan co-
ownership of patient medical records’’6.
Health Plans’ Perspective
Generally, health plans have opposed the regulation of managed care, with
claims that they are guaranteed to raise consumers’ costs, reduce choice, and generate
more federal bureaucracy. The health insurance industry has been running ad
campaigns against both proposals. Collectively, the Health Insurance Association of
America (a national trade association representing 115 million Americans through its 269
trade members); the American Association of Health Plans (AAHP, whose member
plans provide care for more than 140 million Americans); and The Health Benefits
Coalition (a group of business and insurance groups), generally oppose both versions of
the patients bill of rights. These trade organizations stand firm behind the Congressional
Budget Office projections that quantify the cost implication to the health care industry.
146 Morphew, Wendy, "AMA Renews Concern That Aetna/U.S. Healthcare Contracts Interfere With the Patient-Physician
Relationship", AMA Press Release, March 3, 1998.
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Managed care organizations have stated concern that increases in premiums will add to
the ranks of the uninsured. Furthermore, these health plan organizations feel that there
are adequate protections and grievance processes currently in place, and that federal
regulation will only add bureaucracy and administrative costs. Finally, health plans
oppose the liability provision because it encourages the practice of defensive medicine
and will limit their ability to reduce inappropriate care; both of which will drive up costs.
The overriding fear for health plans stems from potentially damaging lawsuits,
and the cost implication that has the potential to force even more people to go without
health insurance. Health plans in opposition of liability frequently cite a figure developed
by The Lewin Group which estimates that for each one percent real increase in
premiums, small business sponsorship of health insurance drops by 2.6 percent, and
approximately 400,000 individuals lose health care coverage. Using the CBO’s
estimated premium increase of 4.8 percent this translates into an additional 1.9 million
individuals at risk of losing health care coverage, in addition to the 43 million uninsured
people who currently cannot afford to purchase health care.
A report released on July 13, 1999, by the federal Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) indicates that national health care spending will grow by 6.5
percent each year for the years 1998 through 2008. According to the report, two of the
factors responsible for this spending increase are the rising number of uninsured, and
"... a continued trend toward increased state and federal regulation of health plans." The
HCFA report also acknowledges that in recent years, managed care has played a
1,7 Morrissey, The Lewin Group, 1997, as cited by CNN in: Your Rights as Patient Up for Debate in Washington, July
1999.
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significant role in controlling the growth of health care spending. Members of Congress
and of state governments should take into account HCFA’s report, and carefully consider
the ramifications to consumers. Patient protections that impose more regulations on
private health plans would exacerbate health care cost inflation and increase the number
of uninsured Americans.
HIAA President (and former Congressman from Ohio) Bill Gradison said at a
briefing that any legislative fix "would undermine the progress that has been made by
managed care in controlling health care costs". Other cost drivers of the patient bill of
rights are the provisions calling for mandatory external appeals and mandatory point-of-
service requirements for HMO plans. While well intentioned, these requirements would
increase costs by imposing a layer of heavy-handed government bureaucracy.
Furthermore, a mandatory point-of-service option (a mandate that would require offering
of a POS plan) would raise costs to consumers by anywhere from three to 11 percent
(Coopers and Lybrand, Shields). In doing so, health plans feel that it would deprive
consumers the choice of lower-cost coverage.
With regard to medical necessity, the two largest health plans in the United
States, UnitedHealth Group ("UHG") and Aetna U.S. Healthcare ("Aetna") have recently
taken strides to jump ahead of government mandated reform. In November 1999, UHG
announced in a press release that it would eliminate the requirement of doctors to obtain
pre-authorization and pre-certification for services that are currently approved 99.1% of
the time, demonstrating a radical departure from past practices. UHG positioned their
decision not as a political one, but as a natural progression in evolution in the delivery of
health care. The program called Care Coordination, "makes obsolete certain programs
associated with traditional medical management, such as pre-authorization for inpatient
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hospital procedures, and enhances clinical decision-making between the patient and
physician’’8. UHG implemented the program in Tennessee first and later in six other
sights. UHG’s preliminary analysis has shown that costs decreased or remained the
same after the program was introduced9.
Speculation versus Reality
To balance speculation with real-life experience, two cases, the patient bill of
rights for federal workers, and Texas’ state law on health plan liability, are offered as
examples from which more concrete implications might be inferred.
Federal Workers’ Bill of Rights
In November 1998, the President’s Advisory Commission on Consumer
Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry developed its recommendations for a
Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities to Congress. The Commission determined
that protection of patients was warranted in order to "strengthen consumer confidence by
assuring the health care system is fair and responsive to consumers’ needs, and to
reaffirm the importance of a strong relationship between patients and their health care
1professionals o The President fully embraced the Commission’s proposal for patient
protection measures, and in March of 1998 required that they be adopted by all federal
148 Press Release: United HealthCare Introduces Care Coordination, November 9, 1999
149 Shapiro, Joseph, Giving Doctors the Final Word, U.S. News, November 22, 1999.
1so AFSCME, Patients’ Bill of Rights, Collective Bargaining Reporter, Number 3:1998
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health programs such as Medicaid, Medicare and the Federal Employees Health Benefit
plan.
This bill imposed a broad set of patient protections on the 285 private insurance
companies that provide health care coverage to approximately 9 million federal
employees and their families. The President permitted a twelve-month period over
which the effected insurance companies would be required to be in full compliance with
the Democratic version of the patients’ bill of rights. The bill includes provisions that
enable patients to sue their health plan; requires health plans to disclose information
about doctors’ compensation; provide comparative information about the quality of
treatment; furnish data on consumer satisfaction, and guarantee patients continuity of
care.
Using this example as a basis for larger scale implementation, the cost estimates
of implementing the Democratic Bill of Rights produce conflicting results. For example,
the President announced in April 1999 that the federal workers’ patient bill of rights
would add a cost of less than $10 per individual per year enrolled in the plan (assuming
9 million enrollees, amounting to $90 million of additional cost). Three months later, in
July, he stated that the Patients’ Bill of Rights raised the cost of health insurance by less
than one dollar a month per enrollee (or roughly $108 million). The Congressional
Budget Office estimated that the Democrat’s bill of rights would raise health care
premiums by 4.8% or by $200 per year per family over a five-year periods2. A
151 Havemann, Judith, Citing Success, White House Plans to Widen Patient Rights Initiative, The Washington Post, April
9, 1999; page A18.
152 Ibid
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comparable figure of $4.75 per member per month can be arrived at using an average
family size of 3.5. In relative terms, Democrat’s patient bill of rights is four times as
expensive when compared the federal worker’s bill of rights. What makes this dollar
comparison difficult, if not feasible, is that federal workers do not have the same rights
for legal redress that are reflected in the Democrat’s bill of rights. Presumably, this
overage constitutes the difference between the two cost estimates.
Health Plan Liability in Texas
Legislation passed in Texas (1997), Georgia, and most recently California, allows
all patients (including those covered under ERISA protected, employer sponsored health
plans) to sue their plan for damages that resulted from health plan treatment decisions,
or coverage denials or delays. This law makes health plans liable for harm that resulted
from a claims administrator, health care advisor, private agent, or any other person from
a managed care entity’s failure to use ordinary diligence. Texas’ law uses an "ordinary
care approach", which is defined in the following manner:
Ordinary care holds health plans liable for damages arising from their
failure or the failure of their employees, agents, ostensible agents,
representatives, or individuals over whom they can influence to exercise
ordinary care or ordinary diligence in making practical treatment
decisions.
The law requires that members use and exhaust external review processes and
procedures prior to taking their case to state court. In addition to being awarded
compensatory damages, patients in Texas have access to punitive damage awards.
Proponents of health plan liability say that a health plan should not be exempt
from making life and death decisions. The basis of this claim is that a managed care
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organization is practicing medicine through its coverage decisions and by its
determination of medical necessity of treatments. Opponents of health plan liability cited
increased litigation and higher health care premiums as two major implications.
However, preliminary data from Texas shows virtually no increase in the number of
lawsuits since the time that health plan liability was enacted. As of September 1998
not one lawsuit had been filed; twelve months later in September 1999, only four cases
had been filed with the state of Texas.
Part of the reason for such a slow start on litigation has to do with the uncertainty
of whether the state law can override ERISA without congressional action. However, in
September 1998, a U.S. district Court ruled that the liability portion of the Texas liability
law was not preempted by ERISA because it concerns issues of quality of care
delivered, which is not considered the business of insurance, such as coverage
disputes. With case law establishing specific interpretation of ERISA in this area,
there may be increases in the number of lawsuits that challenge the quality of medial
treatment received under an employer-sponsored health plan.
A study conducted by Coopers and Lybrand investigated the economic impact of
lifting ERISA preemption. The approach used by the investigators included
calculating cost and incidence rates of litigation from three large non-ERISA populations
Reaves, Jessica, New Signs of Life for Patients’ Rights, Time Magazine, September 30, 1999
UnitedHealth Group Public and Government Affairs, "UnitedHeatlh Group’s Position on Health Plan Liability", January
1, 1999.
ls5 Coopers and Lybrand LLP, Impact of Potential Changes to ERISA: Litigation and Appeals Experience of CalPERS,
Other Large Public Employers, and a Large California Health Plan; report was prepared for the Kaiser Family Foundation,
June 1998
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(where members can sue their health plan) and inferred them to the ERISA population.
At $100,000 per case, and an annual incidence of 0.3-1.4 lawsuits per 100,000
enrollees, the direct cost of litigation was estimated to add between three and thirteen
cents per enrollee per month. The authors drew the conclusion that the additional cost
of lifting ERISA preemption represented a "trivial percentage of premium"6.
Another concern with health plan liability legislation is the potential it has to push
health care professionals to practice defensive medicine. In this kind of atmosphere,
physicians shield themselves from malpractice by ordering expensive tests and
treatments that otherwise may be construed as unnecessary absent the threat of a
lawsuit. For example, the medical director of a Temple, Texas HMO (Scott & White
Health Plan), states that their HMO premiums have risen as a result of approving extra
procedures and treatments to avoid potential lawsuits. He stated, for example, that
"the HMO has been approving the higher cost of MRI technology over CT scans
because of the accuracy and resolution that it affords, despite the fact that is costs $400
more". At the same time, figures reported to the state by health plans indicate that
medical costs in Texas have not begun to spiral and that there have been fewer appeals
of insurance rulings that expectede.
A long-term effect of Texas’ legislation is likely to cut into profits, although not as
a direct result of increased litigation. Instead, HMOs may continue to practice defensive
medicine and face raising the price of their premiums. In turn, HMOs may risk losing
1 Coopers, ibid.
ls7 Shapiro, Joseph, Suing Your HMO: Is it a Right or a Wrong?, U.S. News, September 27, 1999
158 Cropper, Carol Marie, "In Texas, a Laboratory Test on the Effects ofSuing HMOs", The New York Times, September
13, 1998
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market share from their inability to underbid competition. More importantly, quality of
care concerns may resurface in light of fierce price competition. Finally, the uncertainty
of the impact of health plan liability has implications unto itself. Uncertainty has the
potential to breed passive responses by health plans (by absorbing the cost of insuring
against lawsuits, for example) and employers (may choose to reduce coverage levels as
opposed to increase premiums)9.
,5 Studdert, D. et al. Expanded Managed Care Liability: What Impact On Employer Coverage? Health Affairs Vol. 18
(6):15; December 1999.
Chapter 7:
Is a Patient Bill of Rights the ’Right’ Response to the Managed Care Backlash?
Managed care was the industry’s response to unchecked medical inflation in the 70’s
and 80’s and to unsuccessful attempts by the government to reform the system and reduce
costs. Over the past two decades, managed care has grown largely through its appeal to
the purchasers and consumers of health care. Today managed care plans deliver care to
over three-quarters of those with insurance, including Medicare and Medicaid.
Managed care became popular through its demonstrated ability to reduce
inappropriate utilization, which lowered costs. Consumers benefited from lower premiums
and low out of pocket costs. Not everyone, however, embraced managed care, particularly
the providers of health care. Managed care kept costs in tact by placing boundaries on
physicians’ otherwise unbridled treatment decisions. Limits were placed upon the fees
which hospitals and doctors could charge for certain services. Patients’ choice of providers
was confined to a network, and access to specialty care was managed through a
gatekeeper. The restrictive nature of managed care also served to deter the high-risk, high
utilizers of health care, who enjoyed the unchallenged, unlimited care available through a
traditional indemnity plan.
The evolution of managed care and demise of the traditional indemnity insurance
can be described by drawing upon the stages of the Rothschild-Stiglitz economic theory of
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health insurance’S. Initially, managed care benefited from the migration of low risk
individuals from the traditional plans. As movement into managed care continued, indemnity
premiums increased as a result of adverse selection. Traditional insurance borrowed
managed care techniques such as pre-admission certification and pre-authorization for
elective surgery, in attempt to control runaway costs. By the end of the 80’s indemnity
premiums became so exorbitant that even the moderately high-risk individuals moved, albeit
unwillingly, into lower cost managed care plans. The point-of-service (POS) concept
became a popular plan because it combined a managed care network with indemnity-like
coverage for use of out-of-network providers. Networks expanded their provider panels to
accommodate the growth of managed care. The number of primary care physicians and
hospitals per HMO nearly tripled between 1990 and 1995. As managed care grew
provider restrictions and access limitations were lessened to adequately cover the majority
of the enrolled population. As recently as the end of 1999, two national HMOs dropped pre-
authorization requirements for many routinely performed procedures.
By the early 90’s the pooling equilibrium that existed in the indemnity-dominated
market of the 70’s and 80’s began to dissolve. Managed care was becoming less restrictive,
and conversely, indemnity care was increasingly managed. Not surprisingly, as this
occurred, premium costs in both markets began to decline, and at nearly the same rate. By
1995, over three-quarters of enrollment was in a managed care plan, and increased to 86%
in 1998. In effect, the pooling equilibrium had completely switched to the managed care
leo Pauly, M., Nicholson, S. Adverse Consequences ofAdverse Selection, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 24,
No. 5, October 1999. The model explains that if potential insurance purchasers know their risk levels (but is kept from
insurers), and if insurers are willing to offer any profitable contract, a process of self-selection can ensue.
161 Roussel, Hoechst Marion, Mean Number of Providers per HMO Plan, 1991-1998, Managed Care Digest.
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market. As migration out of indemnity plans slowed to a trickle in 1998, an upward trend in
premium costs emerged for the first time in five years.
The Rothschild-Stiglitz model offers an explanation for the public’s discord with
managed care. As high-risk people moved into a seemingly more limited managed care
plan, their adversity toward such restrictions resulted in dissatisfaction, lending an
explanation of the rise in the number of managed care complaints62. By the same token,
low-risk individuals began to shoulder an increasingly higher premium in order to subsidize
costs generated by the high-risk population. The increase in managed care premiums was
slight enough to have gone unnoticed over the past few years. However, this is not likely to
be the case in the near future as managed care premiums have started an uphill climb and
are expected to rise over the next five years. The pooling of high and low risk individuals
into managed care has thus raised the potential for discontent.
The seeds of managed care backlash began to sprout as people were priced out of
the indemnity market, and resentfully moved into managed care. As enrollment increased,
more complaints were voiced. The media and the press highlighted HMO horror stories of a
few, which continued to raise the public’s anger and perpetuated a culture of blame.
Despite American’s first hand experience with managed care, polls and surveys indicate
concern about managed care and the potential negative implications for quality.
Seizing on the public’s confusion about managed care, politicians have made patient
protection one of the hottest campaign topics for the 2000 election year. The debate over
sz Pauly and Nicholson, ibid.
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patient bill of rights has become as much about politics as it is about patients. Americans’
confusion with managed care makes a complex and multi-faceted issue such as patients’
rights more complicated by this basic lack of knowledge. Consumers and policymakers
alike would greatly benefit from education about managed care. For example, although
concern for the deterioration of quality in managed care plans is well established, its impact
remains largely unfounded through controlled studies. Outcome studies performed in the
late 80’s have shown equivalent quality of care and greater access to preventive care
compared to traditional fee-for-service models. Additionally, analyses have demonstrated
that managed care has been instrumental in controlling utilization and holding down health
care costs, even though the general public does not equate cost savings to managed care.
More recently, The Institute of Medicine (IOM) released the results of a multi-year
study of the quality of health care in the United States. The following excerpt from the
September 1998 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) is a
statement from the National Roundtable on Health Care Quality:
Serious and widespread quality problems exist throughout
American medicine. These problems...occur in small and
large communities alike, in all parts of the country, and with
approximately equal frequency in managed care and fee-for-
service systems of care. Very large numbers ofAmericans
163 Miller, R., and Luft, H., Managed Care Performance: Is Quality of Care Better of Worse? Health Affairs, 1997, 16(5):7-25.
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are harmed as a direct result. Quality of care is the
problem, not managed care4.
The IOM study published results indicating that as many as 98,000 people die every
year in hospitals due to errors and accidents. This figure is higher than deaths caused by
car accidents, breast cancer or AIDS6. More generally, errors in medicine are estimated to
account for 150,000 to 400,000 deaths each year. The cost of these potentially preventable
fatalities is estimated to be between $17 billion and $29 billion each year. In spite of
industry experts’ claim that the managed care has wrung out all of the "easy" savings from
the system, there is tremendous opportunity for improvement and cost reduction yet to be
made.
There are other areas of the existing system that would benefit from improvement,
many of which are contrast with America’s knowledge of health care. Dr. David Lawrence, a
member of the IOM’s National Roundtable, offers the following recommendations:
The structure of our medical delivery system is fragmented. More than three-
quarters of physicians practice alone or in small, single specialty groupssT.
Physicians should work and practice medicine in teams. They would greatly
lChassin, MR, Gavin, RW, and the National Roundtable on Health Care Quality, Consensus Statement: The Urgent Need to
Improve Health Care Quality. JAMA, 1998; 280(11):1000-1005.
16s Lawrence, David, MD, The Future of Health Care, Medscape Money & Medicine, Jan. 4, 1999
166 Ibid.
167 Millenson, ML, Demanding Medical Excellence: a Conversation with Michael Millenson, Health Forum, Jan. 1998;41 (5):36-
39.
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benefit from sharing of knowledge and drawing from the experiences of others,
and will work more safely and effectively.
Physicians must be re-certified on a regular basis, similar to pilots who are
responsible for the safety of others. Standards for board certification vary widely
by specialty. The rate at which medical technology and knowledge changes has
made it increasingly challenging for physicians to keep up with current
information. The inability to keep pace with emerging information contributes to
the wide variation in medical practices, which is further influenced by the
community standard, rather than founded upon medical science.
Quality assurance and quality improvement systems are needed for outpatient
care. Nearly two-thirds of medical care is delivered in an outpatient setting and
the data and systems are not in place to analyze process and outcomes
measures. Until there is data from which to build a foundation, physicians can
not effectively monitor improvement, or learn from mistakes.
Physicians would benefit from learning from their own or other’s mistakes.
Unfortunately, the American expectation of the medical society is that of
perfection where mistakes are unacceptable. This unfortunately, has created a
"culture of blame". When medical mishaps and tragedies occur, they are not
show cased. Shared knowledge of these cases and development of safety
systems would contribute toward reducing human errors.
If the public was educated with the above information there may be less
inclination to "blame managed care" and pursue federal legislation as a means of
addressing the quality of care concerns. Likewise, if the public were informed of the
potential consequences, they might form different opinions about being able to sue their
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managed care plan. Yet, some form of patient protection has been implemented in virtually
every state. And with the election year on the horizon, politicians want to raise the issue to
the federal level.
Two patient protection bills have been passed, and both vary in scope and
application as well as the implication for the nation’s health care costs. The Congressional
Budget Office estimates that a one- percent increase in health insurance premiums could
cause as many as 400,000 people to go without health insurance. Already, nearly 43 million
Americans at any given time lack health insurance, and the Democrat’s comprehensive
version of the patients’ bill of rights would add another 1.5 million to the total.
HIAA has projected that by the year 2007; the number of Americans without health
insurance will grow to 53 million one out of every five of the non-elderly. If economic
conditions worsen, the number of uninsured Americans could grow as high as 60 million
one out of every four of the non-elderly. Therefore, this paper argues that providing
affordable health coverage to the millions of Americans who desperately need it should be
the first priority of Congress and the Clinton Administration. In spite of these facts, the
statistics point toward raising the number of uninsured that would result from the increased
cost of health insurance. The culprits of cost increase, health plans liability and medical
necessity, would benefit providers and trial attorneys, while giving the short end of the stick
to the uninsured, to businesses, and to the working poor who struggle to purchase
affordable coverage.
Upon in-depth review of the major patient protection bills and the various provisions
therein, this paper offers the following recommendations:
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Do Not Mandate Health Plan Liability
Health care costs will rise if patients are able to sue their health plan. There is
heightened potential for over-treatment when in fear of malpractice suits. This in turn has
the potential to elicit inappropriate or unnecessary care and may have the unintended effect
of placing a patient at risk for harm. This would make it difficult for health insurers to fight
medical fraud and abuse, which account for approximately one-tenth of the nation’s trillion-
dollar annual health bill, according to government estimates. Each year an unrecorded
number of Americans die or are injured due to medical mishaps, some of which are
attributable to unorthodox or unnecessary treatment.
The controversy with health plan liability stems from the loophole of federal ERISA
laws. Most health plans are able to escape liability through its restrictive policies and bear
little, if any, culpability for the adverse outcomes that may be suffered by a plaintiff. At the
state level, Texas serves as a proverbial laboratory to test the effects of health plan liability.
Although the number of cases to reach the state’s court were not nearly as high as
anticipated, a trend is emerging in the interpretation of the law that may have broad
implications. Recent case law has narrowed the extent of ERISA preemption. A distinction
is being established between disputes over benefit coverage (which is preempted by ERISA
plans) and those over the quality of care administered by the plan (which is not preempted
by ERISA). The court’s interpretation may provide an avenue of recourse for an estimated
125 million individuals covered by employer-sponsored health plans. Currently, these
individuals covered under these plans are limited to recovering only compensatory damages
for the cost of the service that was denied plus legal and court fees.
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At the same time, trial lawyers are beginning to target managed care organizations
for failing in their fiduciary duty to put patients’ interests above the quest for profits. Despite
the mass pursuit, few class action suits have been brought to bear due to the legal
roadblocks presented by ERISA. In December 1999, for example, Connecticut’s largest
HMO, Physician Health Services (PHS) was strapped with a class action suit for denying
patients reimbursement for drugs prescribed by their physicians that were not on PHS’
formulary6.
As an alternative to holding health plans accountable via expensive lawsuits, health
plans can be effectively held publicly accountable through the release of performance
information such as outcome measurements, preventive care, and patient satisfaction. On a
micro-level, physicians benefit from individual report cards showing their performance
stacked up against physician peers in the same network, and to industry-adopted clinical
guidelines. This public accountability tool is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
Do Not Mandate Medical Necessity
Allowing doctors to make medical necessity decisions by loosening utilization review
criteria will only lead our health care system back into the inflation-laden costs experienced
in the 70s and early 80s. Under the medical necessity provision, providers can defend
decisions to prescribe marginal or unnecessary care as being consistent with "generally
acceptable principles of professional medical practice". This allows providers to determine
1 Julien, A., State Going After HMO: Class-Action Suit Targets PHS Prescription Policy, Hartford Courant, Volume CLXl,
Number 349, December 15, 1999
109
what services are covered, including treatments that may no longer be considered effective,
and where and how those services are delivered.
If a standard ’community of care’ approach toward medical necessity were
implemented, variation in quality and increases in costs are sure to follow. Numerous
studies have documented the tremendous regional variation in physician practice patterns,
rendering this so-called "standard" open for interpretation and debate. Needless to say that
it would also be difficult for health insurers to stop provider fraud and abuse.
In November 1999 UnitedHealth Group (UHG) announced that it would no longer
require its physicians to receive pre-authorization or certification for routinely approved
services. In doing so, UHG would eliminate the administrative costs of this utilization review
function, estimated to cost nearly $100 million per year. UHG has been accused of political
maneuvering, but countered these claims by stating that it was a cost-cutting measure69.
UnitedHealth Group’s pilot of their Care Coordination program in six sites showed that costs
either remained flat or went down. While at the outset this appear to be a favorable
outcome, it can be debated that these cost savings, in the long run, are not sustainable. The
underlying tenet of managed care, to contain costs, would be severely compromised.
In lieu of medical necessity, the cost savings attributed to the removal of micro-
management strategies should be applied to medical outcomes studies and toward
establishing clinical care guidelines. These standards, which exist today for many illnesses
Newcomer, LN, M.D., Senior Vice President, Health Policy and Strategy for UnitedHealth Group, The Hour News, October
9, 1999
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and conditions are based upon valid scientific evidence, and provide a basis from which
medical treatment decisions are made. More outcome studies are needed to draw
consensus on best-demonstrated practices- these should become the benchmark against
which health plans and their doctors’ performance will be measured. Outcomes are
reflective of the appropriateness of a physician’s choice of a given strategy, and of the skill
exercised in executing that strategy successfully. This also means that with the human
element involved in decision-making, it is imperfect, and may also be affected by extraneous
factors (i.e., age, gender, health belief of the patient, health status, etc.). To the extent that
these factors are accounted for in the guideline, expected outcomes will follow. As
standards of care are established and practiced, economies of scale will be realized through
consistency and improved outcomes- costs will naturally decrease.
Physician Penalties/Financial Incentives Should Be Structured to Not Unduly
Influence Physicians’ Treatment Decisions
Compensation methods encourage provider accountability by influencing physicians
to optimize outcomes and appropriate practices, as well as eliminate unnecessary or
inappropriate care. Although there is considerable information about managed care’s use of
financial incentives and their association to use of resources, the effect of these incentives
on physicians’ decision making has not been clearly establishedz. It cannot go unnoticed,
however, that in the 1996 Medical Outcomes Study, findings confirmed significantly worse
170 Hiilman, ibid; Hemenway, ibid.
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outcomes for chronically ill elderly HMO enrollees7. This finding suggests that there is a
need to understand better the relationship between different managed care plans impact on
outcomes for sub-populations such as the elderly and the poor. Similar studies conducted
prior to the Medical Outcomes Study were performed at a time when the pooling equilibrium
of health risks between the managed care and indemnity markets was split. Additional
studies are needed to re-evaluate outcomes in managed care settings that have changed
over time. Further, the outcome studies should be stratified by risk category to account for
differences in the mix of patients treated. Results will be helpful in determining the extent to
which outcomes vary as a result of the shift of the pooling equilibrium that has occurred over
the past 5 years.
Various forms of provider reimbursement have been used to encourage
accountability. When done effectively, compensation can be used to influence physicians to
eliminate unnecessary care, optimize outcomes through use of best-demonstrated
practices, and encourage prevention and early intervention, all of which improve quality and
reduce costs. Studies have demonstrated that reimbursement methods have been effective
in changing physician practice behaviors when effective standards of care are in placez2.
Physicians should be awarded on the basis of their performance, not on how many
or how few services or patients they treat. Performance measures should include quality of
care and outcomes measures. For example, the number of heart attack patients that are
Ware, JE et al. Differences in Four-Year Health Outcomes for Eldedy and Poor, Chronically ill Patients Treated in HMO and
Fee-for-Service Systems: Results from the Medical Outcomes Study, JAMA 276(13): 1039-1047.
lz= Brook, RH, Health Affairs, Winter 1995; 14: 77. Grimshaw, JM, Russel, IT, The Lancet, 1993; 342:1317-1322.
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receiving beta-blockers, or number of patients with congestive heart failure that were
prescribed ACE inhibitors to improve circulation, or utilization rates of preventive screenings
for common conditions such as diabetes. Other performance measures can include patient
satisfaction, the cost effectiveness of group practices, or of individuals compared to their
peers. Paid in the form of a bonus, a certain percent (i.e., 10-20%) of physicians’
compensation would be paid at the end of the year.
The percentage of the physician’s withhold should not exceed a reasonable amount
of any physician’s compensation. Financial incentives should encourage preferential
practices, and not perversely impose a conflict with treatment decisions. This is an
important consideration that needs further analysis. However, in the absence of any
financial incentives, research has demonstrated that physicians to not otherwise change
their practice behaviors in favor of more effective standards of care
UnitedHealth Group creates Clinical Profiles using medical and pharmacy claims
data to furnish real-time information about aspects of their physicians’ performance. Every
six months, each participating doctor is provided with an individualized, confidential report
that compares their practice patterns against clinically accepted guidelines. UHG also
provides the physician with information on patients who might benefit from suggested
therapies or tests. In August 1999, UHG released the second round of results that showed
173 Brook, R.H. Health Affairs, Winter 1995; 14:77; Grimshaw JM, Russel, IT. The Lancet 1993; 342:1317-1322.
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an improved trend across six of the program’s clinical measures74. At least initially, this tool
appears to be effective in improving the quality of care.
Establish External Appeals Process Standards
Providing members with access to a third party, independent appeals process offers
a way to hold health plans accountable for coverage determinations. The review should be
completed by an independent entity to avoid a conflict of interest in resolving health plan
coverage disputes. In addition to promoting greater health plan accountability, it provides
consumers with the assurance that disputes will be resolved in a fair and timely fashion.
External independent appeals policies should be implemented in all health plans.
Those health plans that elect to implement an external process will be in a better position to
respond to their member’s concerns regarding health care coverage, and may also attract
more members as a result.
A model process should be developed and endorsed by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners. An external appeals process should:
1. focus on the plan’s terms and conditions for coverage,
2. be limited to expert reviews of medical coverage determinations,
3. require the enrollee to first exhaust the health plan’s internal grievance and
appeals process,
174 UnitedHealth Group, Press Release: UnitedHealthcare’s Profiles Help Physicians Improve Quality of Care to Members,
August 13, 1999.
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4. stipulate the qualifications and independence of the reviewers,
5. be expeditious by specifying strict timelines,
6. be impartial and fair,
7. make external reviewers’ decisions binding on the health plan as well as the
appealing party, and
8. operate on a confidential basis.
The HMO Industry Report, conducted by Interstudy, yielded results that were
contradictory to health plans’ belief that there are adequate protections and appeals
processes currently in place. The survey reported that approximately 74% of responding
HMOs said they do not refer appeals to an external body that makes determinations that are
binding on the HMO. Moreover, of the plans that refer appeals to an external body, 69% are
mandated by state law to do so7. Most health plans have internal grievance processes in
place. However, it is believed that there is a conflict of interest when the review board staff
is contracted or employed by the health plan.
The cost of implementing an external appeal process should be relatively low in
comparison to unpredictable and potentially expensive legal proceedings. An external
appeals process is more beneficial to the health plan member than health plan liability.
According to the Rand Corporation, only 43 cents of every dollar spent on the plaintiff
receives malpractice litigation. While administrative costs associated with an external
review process are not firmly established, information from statewide established programs
175 Interstudy, Interstudy Competitive Edge, ibid.
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ranged from $450 per appeal in Rhode Island to $867 in Floridaz6. Additionally, few
disputes reached external review, and once them, approximately half of the expert reviews
upheld the health plan’s coverage determination.
Conclusion
Even though the public is largely satisfied with their health care plan, they express
concern regarding the quality of care in managed care. Although research shows no
definitive problems with managed care per se, there is a need to respond to the perceived
concerns of the public. The issue at stake is whether the public interest is best served by
government intervention and control of health care, or by the natural market changes that
respond to the demands of consumers. The majority leader of the 105t Congress was
quoted as having stated that "the market is rational, the government is dumb’’7z.
The marketplace has begun to respond to consumer demands for protections, and
should be allowed to continue to do so. The larger health plans are in the best position to
pave the path for the others to follow suit. Those that cannot conform to the expectations of
their customers will not succeed in maintaining market share and will go out of business.
Federal legislation and regulation need not add to the multitude of state law already in place.
Consumer protections should be allowed to continue to evolve in the voluntary marketplace
and need not be federally legislated or regulated.
176 The Lewin Group, 1997.
zz Quote as cited from: http:llarmey.house.govlaxioms.htm
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Consumers throughout the country are reaping the benefits of deregulation through
lower airfares, lower phone bills, and through an increasing array of innovative new products
and services. Federal patient protections will add another layer of regulation to the
protections that exist at the state level and would subject the industry to federal micro-
management of health plans. In effect, this will increase consumers’ costs, raise the number
of uninsured, and deter health plans from seeking to offer innovative new services.
A counter argument to allowing the marketplace regulate the health care industry
may be that, if left alone, the perverted market forces of supply and demand will lead our
nation to bankruptcy. The underlying premise is hardly refutable given that the suppliers of
medical services, physicians, determine the demand for health care services. While this
may be the case in a purely fee-for-service environment, this paper argues that the cost
controls of managed care have placed limits on the open-ended and unchecked nature of
the traditional indemnity market. Prospective payment such as capitation, contain inherent
cost containment mechanisms. If physicians’ capitation payments were appropriately
adjusted to account for the varying levels of risk of their covered population, there may be
less focus on withholding treatment. Risk-adjusted capitation is an important consideration
in light of the shift in the pooling equilibrium into managed care and with the recent Medical
Outcomes Study results.
Finally, as America looks to the future and considers proposal for health care reform,
serious consideration should be heeded to the millions of Americans who would benefit
tremendously from affordable coverage and access to basic health care. At the same time,
the marketplace would benefit from Americans understanding and appreciating the true cost
of health care. There is a need to restore the buyer/seller relationship to patients and their
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doctors, so that patients rather than third-party insurers become the principal buyers of
health care. This may be accomplished by creating institutions in which patients (through
medical savings accounts) spend their own money, rather than someone else’s, when they
purchase health care.
Despite these opinions, the President stands firm in his support of comprehensive
consumer protections at the federal level. As the minority party, however, Democrats
cannot pass their own patient bill of rights, but hope to work out a compromise by amending
different pieces of the package. Regardless of the outcome, the members of Congress and
the Administration need to educate the American people about managed care, and point to
the opportunities for improvement within our existing system before imposing reform.
Federally mandating patient protections for those with health care coverage would benefit
few at the greater expense of many.
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